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THE CRUMBLED DIFFERENCE BETWEEN LEGAL 
AND ILLEGAL ARBITRATION AWARDS:   
HALL STREET ASSOCIATES AND THE WANING 
PUBLIC POLICY EXCEPTION 
Jonathan A. Marcantel* 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Imagine that A, the governor, and B, an individual, entered into an 
agreement whereby B paid A $2,000,000 in exchange for A exercising 
his governmental power to appoint B to a top government position.1  
Imagine further that A and B then reduced the agreement to a writing 
that contains an arbitration provision.  Subsequently, A breaches the 
agreement by failing to appoint B.  Thereafter, an arbitrator awards B 
damages for the breach. 
Consider, perhaps, a more likely scenario. Imagine that two individ-
uals A and B get a divorce and a family court orders A to pay B $2,000 
per month in alimony.  Subsequently, A and B agree that A will pay B 
$100 in alimony per month, in contravention of the court order, in ex-
change for A’s not informing the court of B’s criminal activity.  Imagine 
further that the agreement contains an arbitration clause, B seeks arbitra-
tion of the agreement, and an arbitrator finds that the agreement is bind-
ing, thus reducing the amount of alimony ordered by the court. 
As a matter of ordinary contract law, neither of these contracts is 
enforceable in any court, as both are illegal and thus violate what is 
* Charleston School of Law.  I would like to thank Professors Meredith R. Miller, 
Margaret Lawton, Kirkland Grant, Allyson Haynes, Craig Senn, Barnali Choudhoury, 
William Want, Michael P. Dickey, and Kevin Eberle for their wonderful comments and 
assistance.  Special thanks to Professor Sheila Sheuerman for her advice, comments, 
assistance, counsel, and endless patience. 
 1. This scenario is loosely based on Meguire v. Corwine, 101 U.S. 108, 108-09 
(1879).  Furthermore, while the concept of litigating illegal contracts seems to be 
chimerical, illegal contracts are litigated.  See, e.g., Hammes v. AAMCO Transmission, 
Inc., 33 F.3d 774, 783 (7th Cir. 1994) (reviewing the enforceability of an agreement 
alleged to be in violation of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2006)). 
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commonly known as the public policy exception, a judicial construct 
prohibiting courts from enforcing illegal contracts or contracts that, 
while not illegal per se, are against public interests.2  Furthermore, at 
least until recently, neither arbitration award would be enforceable ei-
ther, as courts would apply the same principle to invalidate the awards.3 
Last year, the United States Supreme Court decided Hall Street 
Associates.4  In this case, the parties entered into a commercial lease that 
included an arbitration provision.  The arbitration provision permitted a 
reviewing court5 to vacate the decision of the arbitrator on grounds not 
included within the Federal Arbitration Act (“FAA”6).7  Applying a 
strict plain meaning analysis, the Court held the review provisions of the 
FAA were “exclusive,” and the phrase “must grant” within section 9 
“unequivocally tells courts to grant confirmation in all cases, except 
when” the FAA explicitly provides a method for vacatur in section 10.8  
Thus, the Court held that vacatur is permitted only on the basis of pro-
cedural irregularities such as fraud, corruption, bias, and exceeding con-
tractual powers.9 
 2. See, e.g., Hurd v. Hodge, 334 U.S. 24, 35 (1948).  Public policy is considered 
“a policy the objective of which is the common good; it is a policy which its maker 
believes will serve the people well.”  Richard H.W. Maloy, Public Policy – Who Should 
Make it in America’s Oligarchy?, 1998 DET. C.L. REV. 1143, 1154 (1998). 
 3. See, e.g., Lewis v. Circuit City Stores, Inc., 500 F.3d 1140, 1150 (10th Cir. 
2007); Lessin v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 481 F.3d 813, 816 (D.C. 
Cir. 2007); B.L. Harbert Int’l, L.L.C. v. Hercules Steel Co., 441 F.3d 905, 910 (11th 
Cir. 2006); Mercy Hosp., Inc. v. Mass. Nurses Ass’n, 429 F.3d 338, 343 (1st Cir. 2005); 
Kergosien v. Ocean Energy, Inc., 390 F.3d 346, 353 (5th Cir. 2004); Greenberg v. Bear, 
Stearns & Co., 220 F.3d 22, 27 (2d Cir. 2000); Bret F. Randall, The History, 
Application, and Policy of the Judicially Created Standards of Review for Arbitration 
Awards, 1992 B.Y.U. L. REV. 759, 769 (1992). 
 4. Hall St. Assocs. v. Mattel, Inc., 128 S. Ct. 1396 (2008). 
 5. Notwithstanding whatever intention the parties might have, the parties cannot 
vest an arbitrator with the color of a judicial officer.  Thus, for an arbitration award to 
be enforceable, the parties must either voluntarily comply with the award or move a 
court to confirm the award.  In the alternative, an aggrieved party can move to vacate or 
modify the award.  Thereafter, of course, either party can appeal to a higher court, argu-
ing the lower court erred by either confirming or denying the award.  See Steven J. 
Burton, The New Judicial Hostility to Arbitration:  Federal Preemption, Contract 
Unconscionability, and Agreements to Arbitrate, 2006 J. DISP. RESOL. 469, 470 (2006). 
 6. Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. § 1-16 (2006). 
 7. Hall St. Assocs., 128 S. Ct. at 1404-05. 
 8. Id. at 1405. 
 9. Id.; see 9 U.S.C. § 10(a). 
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While the Hall Street Associates holding did not specifically 
mention the public policy exception, the Court’s reasoning invariably 
questions its continued existence in the context of arbitration awards, as 
the FAA does not include a “void against public policy” standard.10  
Furthermore, because the public policy exception is a creature of the 
common law,11 the FAA’s provisions are in derogation of it. 
This Article argues that the Hall Street Associates opinion has dis-
placed the public policy exception in the context of enforcing arbitration 
awards, and that displacement offends traditional notions of Lockean 
social contract theory.12  This Article further argues that the courts – as a 
corollary of their duties under the social contract – should adopt the pub-
lic policy exception as an additional ground for vacatur under the FAA 
deriving from their inherent social contract powers.  Part II of this 
Article discusses the historical roots of arbitration and the courts’ tradi-
tional aversion to enforcement of arbitration awards.  It further discusses 
the advent of the FAA as a means to counter the former judicial aversion 
to arbitration and provides a brief discussion of the FAA’s component 
parts, specifically discussing the statutory bases for vacatur under the 
FAA.  Part III then discusses the creation of the public policy exception, 
 10. Professor Cole has also questioned the exception’s continued existence after 
Hall St.  Posting of Sarah Rudolph Cole to ADR Prof Blog, Additional Thoughts on 
Hall Street v. Mattel – Whither Manifest Disregard?, http://www.indisputably.org/?p= 
93 (Mar. 26, 2008) (“Moreover, I believe the decision raises questions about the via-
bility of other judicially-created standards of review such as . . . ‘public policy’ . . . .”).  
Additionally, several lawyers have questioned its continued existence.  See, e.g., Texas 
Appellate Law Blog, U.S. Supreme Court Invalidates Custom Standards of Judicial 
Review Under the FAA, http://www.texasappellatelawblog.com/2008/03/articles/final-
judgments/us-supreme-court-invalidates-custom-standards-of-judicial-review-under-
faa/ (March 25, 2008) (“Hall Street muddies the waters with respect to whether 
judicially created vacatur grounds such as . . . ‘violation of public policy’ remain 
valid.”).  But see LawMemo Arbitration Blog, Hall Street:  Non-statutory Grounds for 
Review, http://www.lawmemo.com/arbitrationblog/2008/03/hall_street_non.html (Mar. 
27, 2008) (stating, without analysis, that the public policy exception has survived the 
opinion).  However, none of these authors, as of yet, have provided more than a 
summary statement of the issue. 
 11. See, e.g., Lewis v. Circuit City Stores, Inc., 500 F.3d 1140, 1150 (10th Cir. 
2007); Lessin v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 481 F.3d 813, 816 (D.C. 
Cir. 2007); B.L. Harbert Int’l, L.L.C. v. Hercules Steel Co., 441 F.3d 905, 910 (11th 
Cir. 2006); Mercy Hosp., Inc. v. Mass. Nurses Ass’n, 429 F.3d 338, 343 (1st Cir. 2005); 
Kergosien v. Ocean Energy, Inc., 390 F.3d 346, 353 (5th Cir. 2004); Greenberg v. Bear, 
Stearns & Co., 220 F.3d 22, 27 (2d Cir. 2000). 
 12. See infra Part III.A. 
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first examining its roots in Lockean social contract theory and then 
discussing its subsequent development in the arbitration context by the 
Supreme Court’s decisions in Hurd13 and Grace.14  Part IV discusses 
Hall Street Associates, providing a brief historical background of the 
case and outlining the Court’s strict plain-meaning reasoning.  Part V 
discusses the impossibility of harmonizing the FAA with the public poli-
cy exception through the use of statutory construction principles, ulti-
mately concluding that Hall Street Associates has displaced the public 
policy exception.  This Part also discusses the negative effects such a 
displacement has on the fabric of the law as well as courts’ social con-
tract duties.  Finally, Part VI discusses three proposals to preserve the 
public policy exception.  The first proposal argues that Congress could 
remedy the problem by simply amending the FAA to include a public 
policy vacatur prong.  This proposal, however, carries two significant 
drawbacks. Congress, through inaction, has demonstrated a reluctance to 
amend the FAA.  In addition, Congressional action is slow, leaving 
considerable time for significant damage to the fabric of the law – a con-
sequence already occurring in lower courts.  The second proposal argues 
courts could interpret existing vacatur provisions within the FAA as in-
cluding a public policy exception.  This proposal, however, suffers from 
a consistency problem.  That is, courts have universally held the public 
policy exception to be a creature of common law.  Moreover, changing 
course in such a dramatic manner gives the appearance of judicial 
caprice, undermining the public’s confidence in the legal system.  The 
last proposal, and the one the author urges courts to adopt, argues the 
courts should view the public policy exception as an inherent power of 
the courts, existing irrespective of express Congressional mandate. 
II.  BACKGROUND OF THE FAA 
While arbitration is presently a hot topic in the legal community,15 
arbitration has existed for centuries16 and has been used as a means of 
 13. Hurd v. Hodge, 334 U.S. 24 (1948) (reaffirming the public policy exception in 
the context of a restrictive covenant that was racially discriminatory). 
 14. W.R. Grace & Co. v. Local Union 759, 461 U.S. 757 (1983) (extending the 
public policy exception to arbitration awards in labor disputes). 
 15. Much of the current debate centers around whether courts can enforce 
heightened-standard-of-review clauses.  See, e.g., Burton, supra note 5; Eric Chafetz, 
The Propriety of Expanded Judicial Review Under the FAA:  Achieving a Balance 
Between Enforcing Parties’ Agreements According to Their Terms and Maintaining 
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alternative dispute resolution in the United States since the country’s 
inception.17  Nevertheless, the United States’ legal system has only fully 
embraced the practice in the last eighty years. 
Throughout most of this country’s existence, the United States judi-
ciary has expressed open hostility to arbitration as a means of conflict 
resolution. That is, American judges initially reasoned that private par-
ties could not through contract do that which they could not otherwise 
do:  “oust” judicial jurisdiction.18  In 1926, Congress tackled this hostili-
ty to arbitration with the enactment of the FAA.19 
Arbitral Efficiency, 8 CARDOZO J. CONFLICT RESOL. 1 (2006); Sarah Rudolph Cole, 
Revising the FAA to Permit Expanded Judicial Review of Arbitration Awards, 8 NEV. 
L.J. 214 (2007); Ilya Enkishev, Above the Law: Practical and Philosophical 
Implications of Contracting for Expanded Judicial Review, 3 J. AM. ARB. 61 (2004); 
Lee Goldman, Contractually Expanded Review of Arbitration Awards, HARV. NEGOT. 
L. REV. 171 (2003); Ann C. Hodges, Judicial Review of Arbitration Awards on Public 
Policy Grounds: Lessons from the Case Law, 16 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 91 (2000); 
Paul F. Kirgis, Judicial Review and the Limits of Arbitration Authority: Lessons from 
the Law of Contract, 81 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 99 (2007); Margaret M. Maggio & Richard 
A. Bales, Contracting Around the FAA: The Enforceability of Private Agreements to 
Expand Judicial Review of Arbitration Awards, 18 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 151 
(2002); Margaret Moses, Can Parties Tell Courts What to Do? Expanded Judicial 
Review of Arbitral Awards, 52 U. KAN. L. REV. 429 (2004); Brett F. Randall, The 
History, Application, and Policy of the Judicially Created Standards of Review for 
Arbitration Awards, 1992 BYU L. REV. 759 (1992); Amy J. Schmitz, Ending a Mud 
Bowl: Defining Arbitration’s Finality Through Functional Analysis, 37 GS. L. REV. 123 
(2002); Kevin A. Sullivan, The Problems of Permitting Expanded Judicial Review of 
Arbitration Awards Under the Federal Arbitration Act, 46 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 509 (2002); 
Stephen P. Younger, Agreements to Expand the Scope of Judicial Review of Arbitration 
Awards, 63 ALB. L. REV. 214 (1999). 
 16. See Kirgis, supra note 15, at 99; Julius Henry Cohen & Kenneth Dayton, The 
New Federal Arbitration Law, 12 VA. L. REV. 265, 266 (1926) (stating arbitration has 
been used as a means of conflict resolution since ancient times); see also Jeffery W. 
Stempel, Pitfalls of Public Policy: The Case of Arbitration Agreements, 22 ST. MARY’S 
L.J. 259, 270 (1990) (stating arbitration has been used in England since at least the 
eleventh century). 
 17. Roger S. Haydock & Jennifer D. Henderson, Arbitration and Judicial Civil 
Justice: An American Historical Review and a Proposal for a Private/Arbitral and 
Public/Judicial Partnership, 2 PEPP. DISP. RESOL. L.J. 141, 144 (2002) (“The use of 
arbitration began in the United States during the colonial period.”); Michael H. LeRoy 
& Peter Feuille, The Revolving Door of Justice:  Arbitration Agreements that Expand 
Court Review of an Award, 19 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 861, 865 (2004) (stating 
arbitration has been used in the United States “almost from the nation’s founding”). 
 18. For the most part, this reluctance was limited.  That is, courts would generally 
enforce arbitration awards once issued.  See Burchell v. Marsh, 58 U.S. 344, 349 
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A. The Essentials of the FAA 
The FAA is a comprehensive statutory structure intended to turn the 
tide of judicial hostility toward arbitration and place valid arbitration 
agreements “on the same footing as other contracts.”20  To achieve that 
end, the FAA informally has three main parts:21  sections intended to 
 
(1854).  However, courts generally would not enforce executory contracts to arbitrate.  
See Ins. Co. v. Morse, 87 U.S. 445, 451 (1874) (stating a party “may submit his . . . suit 
. . . to an arbitration . . . . [However,] . . . agreements in advance to oust the courts of the 
jurisdiction conferred by law are illegal and void”); David J. Efron, Muddied Waters: 
Awards of Punitive Damages in Disputed Arbitration Pursuant to Brokerage Firm 
Customer Agreements, 7 DEPAUL BUS. L.J. 333, 335 (1995); see also Southland v. 
Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 13-14 (1984) (“[T]he need for the law arises from . . . the jealousy 
of the English courts for their own jurisdiction. . . . This jealousy survived for so long a 
period that the principle became firmly embedded in the English common law and was 
adopted with it by the American courts.”) (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 96, 68th Cong., Sess. 
1 (1924)); Maggio & Bales, supra note 15, at 160; Schmitz, supra note 15, 137 (stating 
American courts viewed arbitration as threatening their power); Stempel, supra note 16, 
at 273-74. The reservations of American jurists were largely a construct of British 
courts’ reluctance.  Although English courts were not initially hostile to arbitration, 
scholars believe English courts began to disfavor executory arbitration agreements 
following Lord Coke’s discussion of the revocability doctrine in Vynior’s Case.  
Burton, supra note 5, at 473-74; Schmitz, supra note 15, at 137; Sullivan, supra note 
15, at 520; see Maggio & Bales, supra note 12, at 160 (stating English jurists believed 
the arbitration process would undermine judicial power); see also Stempel, supra note 
12, at 70 (stating English courts were unwilling to enforce executory arbitration 
contracts, holding the contracts were void as against public policy). The revocability 
doctrine presumed that parties could always preserve their right to refuse arbitration and 
invoke the authority of the courts.  Thus, while the courts were willing to enforce 
arbitration agreements once an arbitrator reached a decision, the courts were unwilling 
to enforce agreements to arbitrate when one party decided to renege on the arbitration 
agreement.  Schmitz, supra note 15, at 137.  Eventually, the revocability doctrine mu-
tated into the ouster doctrine, a doctrine providing that parties cannot, through contract, 
refuse the jurisdiction of the courts.  Id. 
 19. The FAA was originally named the United States Arbitration Act, 43 Stat. 883 
(1925) (codified as amended at 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2006)). For further information on the 
history of the FAA, see Haydock & Henderon, supra note 17, at 148 n.35. 
 20. Hall St. Assocs., v. Mattel, Inc., 128 S. Ct. 1396, 1402 (2008); see also 
Buckeye Check Cashing, Inc. v. Cardegna, 546 U.S. 440, 443 (2006); Gilmer v. 
Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 24 (1991); Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 
417 U.S. 506, 511 (1974). 
 21. Other scholars have used tripartite classification systems for large-scale organi-
zation of the FAA.  Their structures, however, are slightly different from the one stated 
herein.  See, e.g., Maggio & Bales, supra note 15, at 162 (creating a tripartite system 
consisting of front-end issues, procedural issues, and back-end issues); Stephen L. 
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define the scope of the FAA,22 sections designed to govern the dynamics 
of arbitration,23 and sections designed to govern the enforcement of arbi-
tration decisions.24 
Unlike the latter two parts, the scope sections do not appear in one 
bundle within the statutory framework.  Instead, the sections are some-
what scattered throughout the scheme.  The scope sections, Sections 1,25 
2, and 14, generally provide that written arbitration agreements for 
maritime transactions and transactions affecting commerce made after 
January 1, 1926,26 are “valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon 
such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any 
contract.”27 
The dynamics part is comprised of five sections – 3,28 4,29 5,30 6,31 
7,32 and 833 – and generally provides procedures for the initiation of 
arbitration, compelling arbitration, and service of process. 
Hayford, Federal Preemption and Vacatur:  The Bookend Issues Under the Revised 
Uniform Arbitration Act, 2001 J. DISP. RESOL. 67, 74 (2001). 
 22. 9 U.S.C. §§ 1, 2, 14. 
 23. Id. §§ 3-8. 
 24. Id. §§ 9-13, 15, 16. 
 25. Section 1 provides definitions for both “maritime transaction” and 
“commerce.”  Of the two, obviously, the more commonly used to invoke the Act is the 
commerce provision.  The Act defines “commerce” as: 
[C]ommerce among the several States or with foreign nations, or in any Territory of 
the United States of in the District of Columbia, or between any such Territory and 
another, or between any such Territory and any State or foreign nation, or between the 
District of Columbia and any State or Territory or foreign nation, but nothing herein 
shall apply to contracts of employment of seamen, railroad employees, or any other 
class of workers engaged in foreign or interstate commerce. 
Id. § 1. 
 26. Section 14 of the Act limits its application to contracts occurring after that date.  
Id. § 14. 
 27. Id. § 2.  While this provision would initially seem to permit general court 
review of contracts pursuant to common law contractual principles, the United States 
Supreme Court has held that this provision does not permit judicial review unless the 
allegation of a common law basis for avoidance inheres to the arbitration clause itself, 
as opposed to the general provisions of the contract.  Buckeye Check Cashing, Inc. v. 
Cardegna, 546 U.S. 440, 444-46 (2006).  Rather, issues of illegality, fraud, and other 
methods of common law avoidance must be argued to the arbitrator, unless they inhere 
to the formation of the contract (e.g. incapacity and authority).  Id.  Of course, once the 
arbitrator issues an award, the courts are then only able to review the decision in 
accordance with 9 U.S.C. sections 10 and 11.  Hall St. Assocs. v. Mattel, Inc., 128 S. 
Ct. 1396, 1403 (2008) (“We hold that §§ 10 and 11 respectively provide the FAA’s 
exclusive grounds for vacatur.”). 
 28. Section 3 is a stay provision, providing that a court must stay litigation upon a 
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The enforcement part – the part most relevant to this discussion – 
includes sections 9, 10, 11, 12,34 13,35 15,36 and 1637, which provide for 
the confirmation and vacatur of arbitration awards. 
B. Statutory Vacatur Standards Under the FAA 
Because arbitrators are not clothed with judicial power, arbitration 
awards under the FAA are only viable if enforced by a court.38  Thus, 
arbitration awards are only enforceable to the extent the winning party 
files a motion for confirmation of the award and a court indeed confirms 
the award.39 
Section 9, which introduces the enforcement provisions, is the 
restricting section that limits judicial discretion.  Specifically, section 9 
states, “[C]ourt[s] must grant [confirmation] order[s] unless the 
[arbitration] award is vacated, modified, or corrected.”40  Sections 10 
and 11 then provide the exclusive bases for vacatur and modification, 
providing a court may vacate a decision: 
(1) where the award was procured by corruption, fraud, or undue 
means; (2) where there was evident partiality or corruption in the 
 
motion demonstrating that the matters contained within the litigation are subject to 
arbitration.  9 U.S.C. § 3. 
 29. Section 4 is the compulsory provision, providing that courts must compel 
arbitration pursuant to a valid arbitration agreement.  Id. § 4. 
 30. Section 5 governs appointment of an arbitrator when the parties cannot or have 
not been able to name one.  Id. § 5. 
 31. Section 6 provides, “Any application to the court hereunder shall be made and 
heard in the manner provided by law for the making and hearing of motions, except as 
otherwise herein expressly provided.”  Id. § 6. 
 32. Section 7 governs subpoenaing witnesses.  Id. § 7. 
 33. Section 8 governs initiation of proceedings in admiralty.  Id. § 8. 
 34. Section 12 governs service of motions to vacate.  Id. § 12. 
 35. Section 13 governs docket management for the courts and pleadings 
requirements.  Id. § 13. 
 36. Section 15 states the “Act of State” doctrine is inapplicable when a court is 
reviewing a motion for confirmation.  Id. § 15.  The Act of State doctrine is a judicially 
created doctrine intended “to effectuate general notions of comity among nations and 
among the respective branches of the federal government.”  First Nat’l City Bank v. 
Banco Nacional de Cuba, 406 U.S. 759, 762 (1972). 
 37. Section 16 governs appeals.  9 U.S.C. § 16 (2008). 
 38. Id. § 9. 
 39. Id. 
 40. Id. 
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arbitrators, or either of them; (3) where the arbitrators were guilty of 
misconduct in refusing to postpone the hearing, upon sufficient cause 
shown, or in refusing to hear evidence pertinent and material to the 
controversy; or of any other misbehavior by which the rights of any 
party have been prejudiced; or (4) where the arbitrators exceeded 
their powers, or so imperfectly executed them that a mutual, final, 
and definite award upon the subject matter submitted was not 
made.41 
Courts have narrowly defined each of these statutory grounds to 
preserve Congressional intent; courts typically only vacate decisions 
bearing some procedural abnormality.42  Thus, for instance, courts have 
 41. Id. § 10.  The modification provisions permit modification: 
(a) Where there was an evident material miscalculation of figures or an evident 
material mistake in the description of any person, thing, or property referred to in the 
award. 
(b) Where the arbitrators have awarded upon a matter not submitted to them, unless it 
is a matter not affecting the merits of the decision upon the matter submitted. 
(c) Where the award is imperfect in matter of form not affecting the merits of the 
controversy. 
Id. § 11.  As the explicit language indicates, none of these sections permit substantive 
review of the arbitrator’s decision.  See Kristen M. Blankley, Be More Specific! Can 
Writing a Detailed Arbitration Agreement Expand Judicial Review Under the Federal 
Arbitration Act?, 2 SETON HALL CIR. REV. 391, 399 (2006). 
 42. See Hall St. Assocs. v. Mattel, Inc., 128 S. Ct. 1396, 1404-05 (2008) (“Sections  
10 and 11, after all, address egregious departures from the parties’ agreed-upon arbi-
tration . . . .”); Porzig v. Dresdner, Kleinwort, Benson, N. Am., L.L.C., 497 F.3d 133, 
139 (2d Cir. 2007) (“The FAA provides four statutory grounds for vacatur in situations 
that involve, generally, impropriety on the part of the arbitrators.”); Haw. Teamsters 
and Allied Workers Union, Local 996 v. United Parcel Serv., 241 F.3d 1177, 1181 (9th 
Cir. 2001) (“Our task is, in essence, to review the procedural soundness of the arbitral 
decision, not its substantive merit.”); Younger, supra note 15, at 243 (“The first three of 
these [statutory vacatur] grounds are essentially procedural in nature:  their concern is 
not with the content or merit of the award, but with the means used by the arbitrators 
(and, in the case of Section 10(a)(1), the parties) in reaching the award. . . . [As to the 
fourth prong,] courts may strike down awards where the arbitrators decide issues not 
submitted to them or grant relief not authorized by the parties.”); see also Major League 
Baseball Players Ass’n v. Garvey, 532 U.S. 504, 509 (2001) (per curiam) (“[I]f an 
arbitrator is even arguably construing or applying the contract and acting within the 
scope of his authority, the fact that a court is convinced he committed serious error does 
not suffice to overturn his decision.”) (internal quotations omitted);  United Paperworks 
Int’l Union v. Misco, Inc., 484 U.S. 29, 38 (1987) (holding a court may not vacate the 
decision of an arbitrator based upon solely legal or factual error); United Steelworkers 
of Am. v. Enter. Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593, 599 (1960) (“[S]o as far as the 
arbitrator’s decision concerns construction of the contract, the courts have no business 
overruling him because their interpretation of the contract is different from his.”); 
606 FORDHAM JOURNAL OF CORPORATE &  Vol. XIV 
 FINANCIAL LAW 
 
interpreted the fraud ground as creating a means for vacatur only for 
misrepresentations to the arbitrator or omissions of material fact.43  The 
bias ground only permits vacatur upon a showing of either non-disclo-
sure of a potential or actual bias on the part of the arbitrator.44  The mis-
conduct ground only permits vacatur for procedural irregularities that 
deprive a party of a fair hearing.45  Finally, the contractual powers 
Kergosien v. Ocean Energy, Inc., 390 F.3d 346, 357-58 (5th Cir. 2004) (“Courts are not 
authorized to review the arbitrator’s decision on the merits despite allegations that the 
decisions rests on factual error and misinterprets the party’s agreement.”).  Other 
scholars like Kratovil, Sullivan, and Hayford have reached similar conclusions about 
the meaning, purpose, and interpretation of the statutory grounds.  See, e.g., Christopher 
D. Kratovil, Judicial Review of Arbitration Awards in the Fifth Circuit, 38 ST. MARY’S 
L.J. 471, 480-85 (2007); Sullivan, supra note 15, at 516-18; Stephen L. Hayford & 
Scott B. Kerrigan, Vacatur: The Non-Statutory Grounds for Judicial Review of 
Commercial Arbitration Awards, 51 J. DISP. RESOL. 22, 23 (Oct. 1996). 
 43. See, e.g., Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters, Local 519 v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 335 
F.3d 497, 503 (6th Cir. 2003); Delta Mine Holding Co. v. AFC Coal Props., Inc., 280 
F.3d 815, 820 (8th Cir. 2001); A.G. Edwards & Sons, Inc. v. McCollough, 967 F.2d 
1401, 1404 (9th Cir. 1992) (per curiam); Forsythe Int’l, S.A. v. Gibbs Oil Co., 915 F.2d 
1017, 1022 (5th Cir. 1990); LaFarge Conseils et Etudes, S.A. v. Kaiser Cement & 
Gypsum Corp., 791 F.2d 1334, 1338 (9th Cir. 1986); Foster v. Turley, 808 F.2d 38, 42 
(10th Cir. 1986). 
 44. See, e.g., Commonwealth Coatings Corp. v. Cont’l Cas. Co., 393 U.S. 145, 149 
(1968) (holding non-disclosure of an arbitrator’s relationship with one of the parties 
constitutes a sufficient basis for vacatur pursuant to the second prong); Applied Indus. 
Materials Corp. v. Ovalar Makine Ticaret Ve Sanayi, A.S., 492 F.3d 132, 137 (2d Cir. 
2007) (“‘[E]vident partiality’ within the meaning of  9 U.S.C. § 10 will be found where 
a reasonable person would have to conclude that an arbitrator was partial to one party to 
the arbitration.”) (citing Morelite Constr. Corp. v. New York City Dist. Council 
Carpenters Ben. Funds, 748 F.2d 79 (2d Cir. 1984)); Positive Software Solutions, Inc. 
v. New Century Mortgage Corp., 436 F.3 495, 501 (5th Cir. 2006); Nationwide Mut. 
Ins. Co. v. Home Ins. Co., 429 F.3d 640, 645 (6th Cir. 2005) (“[E]vident partiality will 
only be found where a reasonable person would have to conclude that an arbitrator was 
to one party to the arbitration . . . .”); JCI Commc’ns., Inc. v. Int’l Bhd. of Elec. 
Workers, Local 103, 324 F.3d 42, 51 (1st Cir. 2003) (“Evident partiality [under the 
FAA] is more than just the appearance of possible bias. . . . [It refers to] a situation in 
which ‘a reasonable person would have to conclude that an arbitrator was partial to one 
party to an arbitration.’”); Delta Mine, 280 F.3d at 820-22 (holding an arbitrator’s 
concealment of a significant relationship indicates that a sufficient basis exists for 
vacatur, unless the parties have expressly agreed to select partial party arbitrators). 
 45. E.g., Lessin v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 481 F.3d 813, 816-
18 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (“The arbitrator ‘need only grant the parties a fundamentally fair 
hearing’ . . . . [A] federal court may vacate an award only if the panel’s ‘refusal to hear 
pertinent and material evidence prejudices the rights of the parties to the arbitration 
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ground permits vacatur only when the arbitrator has exceeded the 
powers provided by the parties in the contract.46  Most importantly for 
purposes of this Article, neither the contractual powers ground nor any 
other of the statutory grounds have been interpreted to encompass vio-
lations of public policy.47  Rather, commentators have routinely stated 
that the public policy exception is a creature of the common law and is 
not encompassed by the statutory vacatur mechanisms.48 
proceedings.’”); Nat’l Cas. Co. v. First State Ins. Group, 430 F.3d 492, 497 (1st Cir. 
2005) (holding to vacate on the basis of exclusion of evidence, the moving party must 
demonstrate the party was deprived of a fair hearing); see also El Dorado Sch. Dist. # 
15 v. Cont’l Cas. Co., 247 F.3d 843, 848 (8th Cir. 2001) (“Courts will not intervene in 
an arbitrator’s decision not to postpone a hearing if any reasonable basis for it exists.”). 
 46. See, e.g., Am. Laser Vision, P.A. v. Laser Vision Inst., L.L.C., 487 F.3d 255, 
259 (5th Cir. 2007) (“The test is ‘whether the award, however arrived at, is rationally 
inferable from the contract.’”); Solvay Pharms., Inc. v. Duramed Pharms., Inc., 442 
F.3d 471, 476 (6th Cir. 2006) (holding the scope of an arbitrator’s authority is provided 
by the agreement for arbitration); 187 Concourse Assocs. v. Fishman, 399 F.3d 524, 
526-27 (2d Cir. 2005) (same); Mo. River Servs., Inc. v. Omaha Tribe of Neb., 267 F.3d 
848, 855 (8th Cir. 2001) (holding an arbitrator’s authority is governed by the agreement 
to arbitrate); Bull HN Info. Sys., Inc. v. Hutson, 229 F.3d 321, 330 (1st Cir. 2000) 
(same); Eljer Mfg., Inc. v. Kowin Dev. Corp., 14 F.3d 1250, 1255–56 (7th Cir. 1993) 
(stating section 10(a)(4) permits vacatur only if “the arbitrator exceeded the powers 
delegated to him by the parties.”); W. Employers Ins. Co. v. Jefferies & Co., 958 F.2d 
258, 262 (9th Cir. 1992) (holding the scope of authority is determined by the contract); 
Younger, supra note 15, at 243 (stating courts refuse to vacate an award under the 
fourth prong, unless the “disputed subject matter or remedy is explicitly excluded by the 
arbitration agreement”). 
 47. See, e.g., Lewis v. Circuit City Stores, Inc., 500 F.3d 1140, 1150-51 (10th Cir. 
2007); Lessin, 481 F.3d at 816; B.L. Harbert Int’l, L.L.C. v. Hercules Steel Co., 441 
F.3d 905, 910 (11th Cir. 2006); Mercy Hosp., Inc. v. Mass. Nurses Ass’n, 429 F.3d 338, 
343 (1st Cir. 2005); Kergosien v. Ocean Energy, Inc., 390 F.3d 346, 353 (5th Cir. 
2004); Greenberg v. Bear, Stearns & Co., 220 F.3d 22, 27 (2d Cir. 2000); Gallus Invs., 
L.P. v. Pudgie’s Famous Chicken, Ltd., 134 F.3d 231, 233 (4th Cir. 1998); 
Painewebber, Inc. v. Argon, 49 F.3d 347, 350 (8th Cir. 1995); Seymour v. Blue 
Cross/Blue Shield, 988 F.2d 1020, 1023 (10th Cir. 1993). 
 48. See, e.g., Kratovil, supra note 42, at 488-89; Brian T. McCartney, Contracting 
for Judicial Review of Arbitration Awards:  Can an “Errors of Law” Clause Provide 
Two Bites at the Apple?, 1997 J. DISP. RESOL. 151, 154 (1997); Maggio & Bales, supra 
note 15, at 165-66; Karon A. Sasser, Freedom to Contract for Expanded Judicial 
Review in Arbitration Agreements, 31 CUMB. L. REV. 337, 343 (2001) (referring to the 
public policy exception as a non-statutory ground); Amanda Spears, Bowen v. Amoco 
Pipeline Co.:  The Tenth Circuit Holds that Parties May Not Contractually Expand 
FAA Standards of Judicial Review, 1 J. AM. ARB. 273, 277 (2002); Stempel, supra note 
16, at 281; Sullivan, supra note 15, at 520; NAT’L CONFERENCE OF COMM’RS ON UNIF. 
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III. THE PUBLIC POLICY EXCEPTION 
The ability to contract has always been subject to limitation.49  
Perhaps the most important of these limitations is the public policy ex-
ception, which prohibits courts from enforcing contracts or awards 
where the contract or award violates the positive law or is more general-
ly against the interest of the public at large. 
A. Lockean Social Contract Theory 
At least in the United States,50 the public policy exception ultimate-
ly stems from Lockean principles of social contract theory.51 
John Locke has had a significant influence on the government of 
the United States.52  His theories are present within the Declaration of 
 
STATE LAWS, UNIFORM ARBITRATION ACT (2000), available at http://www.law.upenn. 
edu/bll/archives/ulc/uarba/arbitrat1213.htm.  
 49. In fact, even the Constitutional prohibition against state infringement of 
contracts has bounds.  See U.S. Trust Co. of  N.Y. v. New Jersey, 431 U.S. 1, 21 (1977) 
(“Although the Contract Clause appears literally to proscribe ‘any’ impairment, . . . the 
prohibition is not an absolute one and is not to be read with literal exactness like a 
mathematical formula.”) (internal quotations omitted); Anonymous Taxpayer v. S.C. 
Dep’t of Revenue, 661 S.E.2d 73, 77 (S.C. 2008) (“To establish a contract clause 
violation, Appellant must show: (1) the existence of a contract; (2) the law changed 
actually impaired the contract and the impairment was substantial; and (3) the law was 
not reasonable and necessary to carry out a legitimate government purpose.”); see also 
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10 (“No state shall . . . pass any . . . [l]aw impairing the 
[o]bligations of [c]ontracts.”). 
 50. The public policy exception has existed in other systems of jurisprudence for 
much longer.  See Trist v. Child, 88 U.S. 441, 448 (1874) (“In the Roman law it was 
declared that ‘a promise made to effect a base purpose, as to commit homicide or 
sacrilege, is not binding.’”) (quoting Institutes of Justinian, lib. 3, tit. 19, par. 24)). 
 51. See Seymour, 988 F.2d at 1023 (stating the exception derives from the public’s 
interest in having its views represented in the adjudication of private contracts); 
Randall, supra note 15, at 781 (“[T]he underlying policy for the exception is that 
federal courts ultimately represent the interests of the public, who would otherwise be 
unrepresented in the private action before the court.”); see also Richard H.W. Maloy, 
Public Policy – Who Should Make it in America’s Oligarchy?, 1998 DET. C.L. REV. 
1143, 1158 (1998) (“[T]he Supreme Court has said that the people, through their 
constitutions and legislative bodies make public policy.”). 
 52. One could make the same claim about Jean Jacques Rousseau and Thomas 
Paine, as they also espoused the social contract theory.  See J.J. Rousseau, On the Social 
Contract, or Principles of Political Right, in CLASSICS OF MORAL AND POLITICAL 
THEORY 913 (Michael L. Morgan ed., 1992); Thomas Paine, Common Sense, in 
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Independence53 and the United States Constitution,54 and they appear in 
opinions from nearly every jurisdiction within the country.55  The 
THOMAS PAINE: COLLECTED WRITINGS (Eric Foner ed., 1995); see also Donald L. 
Doernberg, “We the People”:  John Locke, Collective Constitutional Rights, and 
Standing to Challenge Government Action, 73 CAL. L. REV. 52, 58 (1985) (“But as a 
general matter, the framers established their government in frank Lockean style upon 
the consent of the governed.”) (internal quotations omitted); Brett W. King, Wild 
Political Dreaming:  Historical Context, Popular Sovereignty, and Supermajority 
Rules, 2 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 609, 616 (2000).  Furthermore, while the philosophers 
diverge somewhat on aspects of their theories, none of those divergences are relevant 
here. 
 53. Doernberg, supra note 52, at 64-65; THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 
2 (U.S. 1776). 
 54. Doernberg, supra note 52, at 66-67. 
 55. See, e.g., Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. 386, 388 (1798); Hardie-Tynes Mfg. Co. v. 
Cruse, 66 So. 657, 661 (Ala. 1914); Bush v. Reid, 516 P.2d 1215, 1219 (Alaska 1973); 
Harwood v. Perrin, 60 P. 891, 892 (Ariz. Terr. 1900); E. Poinsett County Sch. Dist. No. 
14 v. Massey, 866 S.W.2d 369, 371 (Ark. 1993); Ex Parte Smith, 38 Cal. 702, 704 
(1869); People v. District Court, 834 P.2d 181, 219 (Colo. 1992); Moore v. Ganim, 660 
A.2d 742, 750 n.29 (Conn. 1995); Bailey v. Philadelphia, W. & B.R. Co., 4 Harr. 389 
(Del. 1846); United States ex rel. Miles Planting & Mfg. Co. v. Carlisle, 5 App. D.C. 
138 (D.C. 1895); Sandarac Ass’n, Inc. v. W.R. Frizzell Architects, Inc., 609 So. 2d 
1349, 1353 n.4 (Fla. Ct. App. 1992); Wilder v. Lumpkin, 4 Ga. 208 (1848); In re Chow 
Bick Git, 4 Haw. 385 (1881); Newland v. Child, 254 P.2d 1066, 1069 (Idaho 1953); 
Union County Reg. Bd. of Sch. Trustees for Use and Benefit of Anna, 367 N.E.2d 541, 
542 (Ill. Ct. App. 1977); Bayh v. Sonnenburg, 573 N.E.2d 398, 415 (Ind. 1991); City of 
Des Moines v. Manhattan Oil Co., 184 N.W. 823, 827 (Iowa 1921); State v. Myers, 923 
P.2d 1024, 1030 (Kan. 1996); Barbour v. Louisville Bd. of Trade, 6 Ky. L. Rptr. 769 
(Ct. App. 1885); Bd. of Barber Exam’rs of La. v. Parker, 182 So. 485, 491 (La. 1938); 
In re Opinion of the Justices, 107 A. 673, 674 (Me. 1919); Birmingham v. Bd. of Pub. 
Works, 239 A.2d 923, 926 (Md. 1968); In re the Opinion of the Justices, 115 N.E. 921, 
922 (Mass. 1917); People v. Collins, 3 Mich. 343 (1854); Johnson v. Gustafson, 277 
N.W. 252, 255 (Minn. 1938); Urban Renewal Agency of City of Aberdeen v. Tackett, 
255 So.2d 904, 905 (Miss. 1971); Kansas City v. Holmes, 202 S.W. 392, 393 (Mo. 
1918); Billings Sugar Co. v. Fish, 106 P. 565, 566 (Mont. 1910); Lindburg v. Bennett, 
219 N.W. 851, 855 (Neb. 1928); Piland v. Clark County Juvenile Court Servs., 457 
P.2d 523, 524 (Nev. 1969); Claremont Sch. Dist. v. Governor, 635 A.2d 1375, 1380 
(N.H. 1993); Behnke v. N.J. Highway Auth., 97 A.2d 647, 652 (N.J. 1953); Williams v. 
Village of Port Chester, 89 N.Y.S. 671, 674 (N.Y. App. Div. 1904); Briggs v. City of 
Raleigh, 141 S.E. 597, 601 (N.C. 1928); State v. Burr, 598 N.W.2d 147, 159 (N.D. 
1999); Uricich v. Kolesar, 7 N.E.2d 413, 415 (Ohio Ct. App. 1936); Thomas v. Reid, 
285 P. 92, 97 (Okla. 1930); State v. Ciancanelli, 121 P.3d 613, 625 (Or. 2005); William 
Goldman Theaters Inc. v. Dana, 173 A.2d 59, 75 (Pa. 1961); Bailey v. Baronian, 394 
A.2d 1338, 1343 (R.I. 1978); Owens v. Lucas, 1 Brev. 519 (S.C. 1805); In re Opinion 
of the Judges, 162 N.W. 536, 538 (S.D. 1917); Arutanoff v. Metro. Gov. of Nashville & 
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central premise of Lockean governmental theory revolves around a 
concept called the “social contract” or “social compact.”56  According to 
this “social contract” theory, people were originally born within a state 
of nature, in which every person initially constituted his or her own indi-
vidual government – choosing his or her own laws of morality, conduct, 
and punishment.57  When these individuals began to organize in groups 
– entered into social contracts – each individual government delegated 
some of its powers to the organization or the new government.58  That 
new government then became a trustee or steward, acting on behalf of 
the component individuals for their safety and protection.59  Of course, 
the new government cannot act for itself and thus found it necessary to 
democratically appoint officers or servants to act on its behalf, creating 
Davidson County, 448 S.W.2d 408, 410 (Tenn. 1969); Republican Party of Tex. v. 
Dietz, 940 S.W.2d 86, 91 (Tex. 1997); State ex. rel. Jugler v. Grover, 125 P.2d 807, 814 
(Utah 1942); Benning v. State, 641 A.2d 757, 760 (Vt. 1994); Council of Town of 
Farmville v. Walker, 43 S.E. 558, 561 (Va. 1903); Weber v. Doust, 146 P. 623, 625 
(Wash. 1915); State ex. rel. K.M. v. W. Va. Dep’t of Health and Human Res., 575 
S.E.2d 393, 403 (W. Va. 2002); State ex. rel. City of New Richmond v. Davidson, 90 
N.W. 1067, 1069 (Wis. 1902); Atchison v. Career Serv. Council of State of Wyo., 664 
P.2d 18, 26 (Wyo. 1983). 
 56. John Locke, Second Treatise of Government, in CLASSICS OF MORAL AND 
POLITICAL THEORY 768-69 (Michael L. Morgan ed., 1992). 
 57. Id. at 738-39 (“To understand political power right, and derive it from its 
original, we must consider what state all men are naturally in, and that is, a state of 
perfect freedom to order their actions, and dispose of their possessions and persons, as 
they think fit . . . .”); King, supra note 52, at 617. 
 58. Locke, supra note 56, at 764 (“But because no political society can be, nor 
subsist, without having in itself the power to preserve the property, and, in order 
thereunto, punish the offences of all those of that society; there and there only is 
political society, where every one of the members hath quitted his natural power, 
resigned it up into the hands of the community . . . .”).  Absolute sovereignty, of course, 
remains with the people.  See King, supra note 52, at 617.  These principles have been 
expressly adopted by the Supreme Court.  See, e.g., Kennett v. Chambers, 55 U.S. 38, 
11 (1852) (“For as the sovereignty resides in the people, every citizen is a portion of 
[the government], and is himself personally bound by the laws . . . . The compact is 
made by the department of the government upon which he himself has agreed to confer 
the power.”). 
 59. See Locke, supra note 56, at 780 (“The great end of men’s entering into society 
being the enjoyment of their properties in peace and safety . . . .”); Trist v. Child, 88 
U.S. 441, 450 (1874) (“The theory of our government is, that all public stations are 
trusts . . . . No people can have any higher public interest, except the preservation of 
their liberties, than integrity in the administration of their government in all its 
departments.”). 
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laws for the public’s protection and then enforcing them.  Those laws 
became the public policy.60 
The public policy exception is thus simply an extension of the 
government’s absolute duty as trustee to act only with the consent of the 
majority for their individual and collective protection.  At its fundamen-
tal base, the exception provides that individual parties cannot force the 
peoples’ governmental representatives to exercise social-contract power 
to enforce agreements prohibited by the majority.61  Any other action by 
the government, other than invalidation, would create a paradox:  the 
people would be creating the public policy and simultaneously violating 
it through governmental representatives.  Such an action by the govern-
ment would necessarily violate the social contract62 – the great trust the 
public has placed in the hands of its government and representatives. 
B. The Supreme Court’s Historical Use of the Public Policy Exception 
The Supreme Court has used the public policy exception to invali-
date contracts in a variety of contexts, dating back to at least the nine-
teenth century.  For instance, the Court has held that the exception ap-
plies where the contract requires an illegal act,63 compensates a party for 
procuring a government contract,64 compensates a party for using per-
sonal influence to secure legislation,65 compensates a party for exercis-
ing the power of government appointments,66 is the vehicle for bribery 
 
 60. See Locke, supra note 56, at 781 (stating every person within society is bound 
by the act of the majority, as that is law, which is necessarily for the public good and 
the preservation of mankind); see also Hurd v. Hodge, 334 U.S. 24, 34-35 (1948) 
(“[T]he public policy of the United States [is] . . . manifested in the Constitution, 
treaties, federal statutes, and applicable legal precedents.”); United States v. Trans-Mo. 
Freight Ass’n, 166 U.S. 290, 340 (1897) (“[W]hen the lawmaking power speaks upon a 
particular subject, over which it has constitutional power to legislate, public policy in 
such a case is what the statute enacts.”). 
 61. Cf. Enkishev, supra note 15, at 107 (stating private parties cannot alter judicial 
review standards through contract, as such an action would violate principles discussed 
in both Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137 (1803) and McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 
316 (1819)). 
 62. See Locke, supra note 56, at 780 (stating the government is bound by the social 
contract to dispense justice consistent with the laws of the majority, and no one can 
“discharge any member of the society from his obedience” to the majority). 
 63. Sage v. Hampe, 235 U.S. 99, 105 (1914). 
 64. Tool Co. v. Norris, 69 U.S. 45, 52 (1864). 
 65. Trist v. Child, 88 U.S. 441, 450 (1874). 
 66. Meguire v. Corwine, 101 U.S. 108 (1879). 
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of a public official,67 requires fictitious bids for a government contract,68 
or requires a treasonous offense,69 among others. 
Modern public policy jurisprudence derives from the Court’s 1948 
decision in Hurd v. Hodge.70  In Hurd, the plaintiffs lived in a communi-
ty governed by restrictive covenants that prohibited the sale of property 
to African Americans.  Despite these restrictions several owners sold 
properties to Hurd, an African American.71  The plaintiffs then sued 
Hurd in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia, 
seeking injunctive relief on the basis of the covenants.72  The district 
court granted the injunction, holding that the deed to Hurd was void be-
cause it violated the covenants.73  The court further enjoined any transfer 
of covenanted property to African Americans and ordered Hurd to re-
move himself from the property within sixty days.74  The United States 
Supreme Court granted certiorari to determine whether enforcement of 
the restrictive covenant by a federal court violated the Due Process 
Clause of the Fifth Amendment.75  Avoiding the constitutional issue, 
however, the Court held that the restrictive covenant conflicted with the 
Civil Rights Act76 and was thus unenforceable.77  As an additional 
 67. Oscanyan v. Arms Co., 103 U.S. 261, 277 (1880). 
 68. McMullen v. Hoffman, 174 U.S. 639, 651-54 (1899). 
 69. Sprott v. Supreme Court of U.S., 87 U.S. 459, 463 (1874). 
 70. 334 U.S. 24 (1948).  The Court invalidated similar conduct at the state level in 
Shelly v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948).  Nevertheless, Hurd is almost exclusively cited 
as the impetus for modern public policy jurisprudence. 
 71. Hurd was a consolidated case.  For simplicity, however, I will only refer to 
Hurd. 
 72. See Hurd, 334 U.S. at 27. 
 73. Id. 
 74. Id. 
 75. Id. at 28. 
 76. 8 U.S.C. § 42 (1950) (“[A]ll persons born in the United States and not subject 
to any foreign power . . . are hereby declared to be citizens of the United States; and 
such citizens, of every race and color, . . . shall have the same right, in every state and 
Territory in the United States, to make and enforce contracts, to sue, to be parties, and 
give evidence, to inherit, purchase, lease, sell, hold, and convey real and personal 
property, and to full and equal benefit of all laws . . .”) amended by 42 U.S.C. § 1981 
(2006) (“All persons within the jurisdiction of the United States shall have the same 
right in every State and Territory to make and enforce contracts, to sue, be parties, give 
evidence, and to the full and equal benefit of all laws and proceedings for the security of 
persons and property as is enjoyed by white citizens . . . The rights protected by this 
section are protected against impairment by nongovernmental discrimination and 
impairment under color of State law.”). 
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ground for reversal, the Court summarily held, as a general matter, that 
courts are obligated to deny enforcement of private agreements when en-
forcement would violate public policy.78 
While the ruling in Hurd was nothing new and, in fact, simply reaf-
firmed well-worn principles, the opinion quickly became a watermark 
because of the manner in which the Court subsequently applied those 
principles.  Following Hurd, the federal courts began using the public 
policy exception on a much more frequent basis.79 
C. Grace and the Development of the Public Policy Exception 
 in the Context of Labor Arbitrations 
The frequent use of the public policy exception eventually expand-
ed jurisprudentially when, in W.R. Grace & Company,80 the Supreme 
Court began using the exception in the context of arbitrations.  In Grace, 
the Grace Company entered into a collective bargaining agreement with 
a local union (the “Union”).81  Then, in response to a lawsuit for viola-
tion of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,82  Grace entered into a 
conciliation agreement83 with the Equal Employment Opportunity 
Commission (“the EEOC”),84 the substantive provisions of which were 
inconsistent with the collective bargaining agreement. 
In a subsequent lawsuit brought by the Union, the district court ulti-
mately granted summary judgment in favor of Grace, holding that the 
conciliation agreement was superior to the collective bargaining agree-
ment, and thus, the collective bargaining agreement could be modified 
so as to comply with the Civil Rights Act.85  The Union then appealed to 
 
 77. Hurd, 334 U.S. at 34-35. 
 78. Id. 
 79. James Michael Magee, The Public Policy Exception to Judicial Deferral of 
Labor Arbitration Awards – How Far Should Expansion Go?, 39 S.C. L. REV. 465, 
468-76 (1988). 
 80. W.R. Grace & Co. v. Local Union 759, 461 U.S. 757 (1983). 
 81. Id. at 759. 
 82. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (2006). 
 83. Pursuant to the Statute, the EEOC may enter such an agreement as a manner of 
eliminating discrimination after a finding of such by the EEOC.  42 U.S.C. § 2000e-
5(b). 
 84. The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission is a federal agency which 
handles employment discrimination complaints. 
 85. Grace, 461 U.S. at 761. 
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the fifth circuit.86  While the appeal was pending, Grace laid off employ-
ees consistent with the district court order but in violation of the collec-
tive bargaining agreement.87 
The fifth circuit reversed,88 and the grievances proceeded to arbitra-
tion.89  Throughout the arbitration proceedings, Grace admitted it had 
terminated employees during the pending appeal.90  Nevertheless, Grace 
argued the arbitrators could not find a breach of the collective bargain-
ing agreement because Grace was acting consistently with the district 
court’s order.91  The arbitrator disagreed with Grace, finding Grace’s 
conduct, while consistent with the district court’s order, was nonetheless 
in breach of the collective bargaining agreement.92  Grace then moved to 
prevent enforcement of the collective bargaining agreement for the 
period of time when the original appeal was pending before the fifth 
circuit.93  The district court agreed and issued an order to that effect.94 
Ultimately, the Supreme Court held that courts are obligated not to 
enforce agreements conflicting with public policy.95  Further, the Court 
created the framework for evaluating contracts under the public policy 
exception.  Specifically, to be unenforceable by a court, the public poli-
cy must be “well defined and dominant, and . . . [must be] ascertained by 
‘reference to the laws and legal precedents and not from general 
considerations of supposed public interests.’”96  Nevertheless, the Court 
held that no such prohibition existed in Grace, as Grace created its own 
impossible predicament.97  That is, Grace generated the situation where-
in it had to choose between the court’s order and the collective bargain-
ing agreement.  Thus, Grace could not then use that conflict as a basis to 
avoid its contractual duties.98 
 86. Southbridge Plastics Div. v. Local 759, Int’l Union of the United Rubber, Cork, 
Linoleum and Plastic Workers, 565 F.2d 913 (5th Cir. 1978). 
 87. Grace, 461 U.S. at 761. 
 88. Southbridge Plastics, 565 F.2d at 913. 
 89. Grace, 461 U.S. at 762. 
 90. Id. 
 91. Id. 
 92. Id. 
 93. Id. at 764. 
 94. Id. 
 95. Id. at 766. 
 96. Id. at 766 (quoting Muschany v. United States, 324 U.S. 49, 66 (1945)). 
 97. Id. at 767. 
 98. Id. 
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D. The Public Policy Exception in the Context of Arbitrations  
Under the FAA 
Significant differences undeniably exist between arbitrations of 
collective bargaining agreements and arbitrations conducted pursuant to 
the FAA.99  Nevertheless, the federal courts began using the public poli-
cy exception as an extra-statutory basis for vacatur under the FAA,100 
reasoning the public policy exception was inherent in all contracts, and 
arbitrations were essentially dispute mechanisms generated by contract. 
Specifically, the circuits generated essentially three different forms of 
public policy exceptions:  illegality, award, and pure policy.101 
Under the illegality public policy form,102 the contract itself seeks a 
result that violates a statutory or constitutional provision.  For example, 
an agreement to move prostitutes across state lines would fall within the 
illegality public policy exception because the object of the contract vio-
lates positive law.103  Before Hall Street Associates, nearly all of the 
 
 99. Most notable, of course, is that arbitrations of collective bargaining agreements 
are judicially reviewed pursuant to the Labor Management Relations Act of 1947, 29 
U.S.C. § 185 (2006), which permits the federal courts, using the federal common law, 
to develop standards of vacatur.  Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448, 
450-51 (1957). 
 100. See supra note 47. 
 101. Cf. Randall, supra note 3, at 770 (stating the three categories are: “cases in 
which the arbitrator has applied an incorrect legal standard . . . cases in which the un-
derlying contract was made in violation of the law; and . . . awards that compel a viola-
tion of the law”). 
 102. Professor Randall treats illegality as a separate exception.  See id. However, to 
the extent the two are separate exceptions, that distinction has been applied by neither 
the Supreme Court nor its inferior federal courts. 
 103. See 18 U.S.C.S. § 2421 (2006): 
Whoever knowingly transports any individual in interstate or foreign commerce, or in 
any Territory or Possession of the United States, with intent that such individual 
engage in prostitution, or in any sexual activity for which any person can be charged 
with a criminal offense, or attempts to do so, shall be fined under this title or 
imprisoned not more than 10 years, or both. 
Id.  See also 18 U.S.C.S. § 371 (2006): 
If two or more persons conspire either to commit any offense against the United 
States, or to defraud the United States, or any agency thereof in any manner or for any 
purpose, and one or more of such persons do any act to effect the object of the 
conspiracy, each shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than five years 
or both. 
Id. 
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federal courts permitted illegality as a non-statutory basis for vacatur 
under the FAA.104 
The award public policy form arises where the contract itself does 
not have an illegal object or purpose, but the arbitrator’s award never-
theless violates constitutional or statutory prohibitions.105  Thus, for 
example, imagine that A owns a large hotel that serves multi-state and 
multi-national clientele, and B rents a room106 through an online travel 
service.  Imagine further that the contract between A and B includes an 
arbitration clause.  Several weeks later, B attempts to check-in to the 
hotel.  However, A denies B entry into the hotel on the basis that B is an 
African American.  B then seeks arbitration of the dispute. During the 
arbitration, the arbitrator finds that A did not breach the agreement by 
denying B admission on the basis of B’s racial status.  The arbitrator fur-
ther enjoins B from entering the premises. While the contract itself is 
legal (as it is simply a contract between a hotel and a customer), the 
award is not, because it violates the Civil Rights Act,107 the principles 
established in Hurd,108 and the social contract.109 
Finally, the pure policy form110 exists where neither the contract nor 
the award violates constitutional or statutory law, but the award does 
violate public policy.111  These situations usually arise in the labor con-
 104. See supra note 47. 
 105. See Randall, supra note 3, at 769-70. 
 106. A similar situation was held to be “commerce” under the Commerce Clause, 
and thus, arbitration clauses of this nature should hypothetically suffice to invoke the 
provisions of the FAA.  See Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241, 
258 (1964). 
 107. 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (2006). 
 108. Hurd v. Hodge, 334 U.S. 24, 34-35 (1948). 
 109. See Locke, supra note 56, at 781 (stating the government is bound to dispense 
justice consistent with the positive law). 
 110. Notwithstanding open criticism from scholars and judges alike, the Supreme 
Court has explicitly authorized this form.  See E. Associated Coal Corp. v. United Mine 
Workers of Am., Dist. 17, 531 U.S. 57, 63 (2000) (stating that courts may refuse to 
enforce an agreement on the basis of the public policy exception, even absent a 
violation of positive law).  Furthermore, this form has been used regularly as a method 
for vacatur by the federal circuits.  See, e.g., PaineWebber, Inc. v. Agron, 49 F.3d 347, 
350 (8th Cir. 1995); Gulf Coast Indus. Workers Union v. Exxon Co., U.S.A., 991 F.2d 
244, 257 (5th Cir. 1993); Delta Airlines, Inc. v. Air Line Pilots Ass’n Int’l, 861 F.2d 
665, 674-75 (11th Cir. 1988). 
 111. This form has two “sub-forms”:  (1) occasions when the award itself violates 
public policy, and (2) occasions when the underlying conduct violates public policy.  
See Harry T. Edwards, Judicial Review of Labor Arbitration Awards: The Clash 
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text,112 but can also surface in other contexts as well.  Furthermore, these 
almost always arise in situations where the contract or award endangers 
the safety of the public.  For example, imagine A owns a company that 
generates dangerous chemicals, and B owns a company that ships those 
chemicals across the country.  Imagine further that A and B reach an 
agreement whereby B will ship A’s chemicals, but A must relieve B of 
all future liability, including liability arising from intentional torts.113  Of 
course, the agreement contains an arbitration provision.  Several months 
after the execution of the agreement, A and B have a disagreement over 
payment provisions of the contract and, as revenge, B intentionally 
dumps a container of chemicals on A’s property.  B then terminates the 
contract and A seeks arbitration.  At the arbitration hearing, the arbi-
trator finds that B breached the contract by terminating it.  Nevertheless, 
the arbitrator finds that B was not liable for intentionally dumping the 
chemicals, as the contract specifically limited B’s liability for intentional 
torts. 
This situation is different from the prostitution ring example114 in 
that neither the contract nor the award affirmatively violates the positive 
law.  But the award violates the social contract or the public policy of 
protecting the public.115 
Between the Public Policy Exception and the Duty to Bargain, 64 CHI.–KENT L. REV. 3, 
8-21 (1988).  Allegations that the underlying conduct violates public policy, without 
more, are insufficient to justify vacatur.  E. Associated Coal Corp., 531 U.S. at 63. 
 112. Arbitrations of labor-related issues are not properly governed by the FAA.  
Rather, labor-related arbitrations are governed by the Labor Management Relations Act 
of 1947, 29 U.S.C. § 185 (2006). Nevertheless, the federal courts rule regularly on the 
vacatur provisions of the FAA within the labor-law context.  See, e.g., UMass Mem’l 
Med. Ctr., Inc. v. United Food & Commercial Workers Union, Local 1445, 527 F.3d 1, 
5-6 (1st Cir. 2008); Howard Univ. v. Metro. Campus Police Officer’s Union, 512 F.3d 
716, 721-22 (D.C. Cir. 2008); Brentwood Med. Assocs. v. United Mine Workers of 
Am., 396 F.3d 237, 241 (3d Cir. 2005); Int’l Bhd of Teamsters, Local 519 v. United 
Parcel Serv., Inc., 335 F.3d 497, 503 n.2 (6th Cir. 2003); Smart v. Int’l Bhd of Elec. 
Workers, Local 702, 315 F.3d 721, 724-26 (7th Cir. 2002). 
 113. Such a provision would violate traditional notions of the common law.  See 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 195 (1981).  However, the positive law does 
not include the common law.  See Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 722 (2004) 
(differentiating positive law from the common law). 
 114. See supra note 103 and accompanying text. 
 115. See Locke, supra note 56, at 780 (“The great end of men’s entering into society 
being the enjoyment of their properties in peace and safety . . . .”). 
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IV.  HALL STREET ASSOCIATES AND THE SHIFT TOWARDS  
EXCLUSIVITY UNDER THE FAA 
While the above forms were certainly the norm prior to Hall Street 
Associates, the Supreme Court – either intentionally or negligently – has 
compromised their continued existence. 
As the number of arbitrations under the FAA grew, parties began 
altering its substantive provisions through contract.  Specifically, parties 
began contracting for vacatur standards that did not exist within section 
10 of the Act.  This movement eventually percolated into the court sys-
tem through the confirmation procedures outlined in section 9.  After 
conducting the arbitration in accordance with the contract, parties began 
seeking judicial review under the heightened review standards.  The cir-
cuit courts then split on whether such provisions were enforceable.116  
All this created the backdrop for Hall Street Associates. 
In this case, Hall Street Associates, L.L.C. (“Hall Street”) entered 
into a contract with Mattel, Inc. (“Mattel”), whereby Hall Street agreed 
to lease a manufacturing site to Mattel.117  The lease included a prede-
cessor indemnification clause, requiring that Mattel indemnify Hall 
Street for fines, fees, or costs associated with violation of environmental 
laws by Mattel’s predecessors.118 
Mattel terminated the lease, however, when it learned that the 
property was contaminated.119 Hall Street then sued Mattel, alleging 
Mattel breached the lease by terminating it and by refusing to pay the 
 116. Compare P.R. Tel. Co. v. U.S. Phone Mfg. Corp., 427 F.3d 21, 31 (1st Cir. 
2005) (holding the FAA permits parties to contract for a heightened standard of 
review), Jacada (Europe), Ltd. v. Int’l Mktg. Strategies, Inc., 401 F.3d 701, 710 (6th 
Cir. 2005) (same), Roadway Package Sys., Inc. v. Kayser, 257 F.3d 287, 288 (3d Cir. 
2001) (same), Syncor Int’l Corp. v. McLeland, 120 F.3d 262 (4th Cir. 1997) (same in an 
unpublished opinion), and Gateway Techs., Inc. v. MCI Telecomms. Corp., 64 F.3d 
993, 997 (5th Cir. 1995) (same), with Kyocera Corp. v. Prudential-Bache Trade Servs., 
Inc., 341 F.3d 987, 1000 (9th Cir. 2003) (en banc) (holding the FAA prohibits parties 
from contracting for a heightened standard of review), Bowen v. Amoco Pipeline Co., 
254 F.3d 925, 936 (10th Cir. 2001) (same), UHC Mgmt. Co. v. Computer Scis. Corp., 
148 F.3d 992, 997-98 (8th Cir. 1998) (indicating, in dicta, parties cannot contract for 
heightened review under the FAA), K & T Enters., Inc. v. Zurich Ins. Co., 97 F.3d 171, 
175 (6th Cir. 1996), and Chicago Typographical Union v. Chicago Sun-Times, Inc., 
935 F.2d 1501, 1505 (7th Cir. 1991) (stating in dicta that parties may not create 
jurisdiction by contract). 
 117. Hall St. Assocs. v. Mattel, Inc., 128 S. Ct. 1396, 1400 (2008). 
 118. Id. 
 119. Id. 
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cleanup costs of the environmental contamination.120  The parties subse-
quently agreed to submit the cleanup issue to arbitration, which was ap-
proved and incorporated into a court order.121 The resulting arbitration 
agreement contained a provision regarding expanded judicial review.  
Specifically, the agreement provided:  “The Court shall vacate, modify 
or correct any award:  (i) where the arbitrator’s findings of facts are not 
supported by substantial evidence, or (ii) where the arbitrator’s conclu-
sions of law are erroneous.”122 
The arbitrator ultimately concluded no indemnification was due un-
der the lease “because the lease obligation to follow all applicable 
federal, state, and local environmental laws did not require compliance 
with the testing requirements of the Oregon Drinking Water Quality Act 
. . . .”123  Hall Street then moved to vacate the arbitration award, arguing 
that the arbitrator committed legal error by ignoring the Oregon 
Drinking Water Quality Act.124  The district court granted the motion, 
holding the arbitrator committed legal error and the court could grant va-
catur on that ground because the parties had so contracted.  The district 
court then remanded the matter to the arbitrator.125  On remand, the arbi-
trator found in favor of Hall Street.126  On further appeal, the Ninth Cir-
cuit reversed, holding the FAA does not permit parties to contract for 
standards of review divergent from those included within 9 U.S.C. § 
10.127 
The United States Supreme Court thereafter granted certiorari to de-
termine whether the FAA permits parties to contract for standards of re-
 120. Id. at 1400. 
 121. Id. at 1400-01. 
 122. Id. 
 123. Id. at 1401. 
 124. Id. 
 125. Id. 
 126. Id. 
 127. Id.  Between the ninth circuit’s initial review and the Supreme Court’s ultimate 
review, the case took additional procedural turns.  After the ninth circuit reversed the 
district court here, it remanded the case to reconsider the motion for confirmation using 
only the standards within the FAA.  Hall St. Assocs. v. Mattel, Inc., 113 Fed. Appx. 
272, 273 (9th. Cir. 2004).  Subsequently, on remand, the district court again granted the 
motion to vacate, holding the arbitrator’s award was an “implausible” interpretation of 
the contract, and thus, the arbitrator exceeded his power’s under 9 U.S.C. § 10(4). On 
appeal, the ninth circuit again reversed, holding that implausibility is not a ground for 
vacatur pursuant to the FAA.  Hall St. Assocs. v. Mattel, Inc., 196 Fed. Appx. 476, 477 
(9th Cir. 2006). 
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view beyond those provided within section 10.  The Court agreed with 
the Ninth Circuit that the FAA does not permit heightened vacatur 
standards, explaining that the plain meaning of the text compelled the 
Court to view the provisions of sections 10 and 11 as exclusive.128 
In its decision, the Court focused on the words “must grant” found 
in section 9, which provides that upon application by any party to con-
firm an arbitration award, a court “must grant such an [award] unless the 
award is vacated, modified, or corrected as prescribed in sections 10 and 
11 of this title.”129  Thus, in the Court’s view, this language was compul-
sory and indicated Congress’ intent that the provisions therein be com-
pletely exclusive.130 
In addition, the Court refuted two arguments presented by Hall 
Street.  First, Hall Street argued parties were able to expand judicial re-
view because the Court in Wilko v. Swan131 permitted a common law, 
extra-statutory method of review:  the manifest disregard of the law 
test.132  Hall Street maintained that if the Court is free to expand the stat-
 128. Hall St. Assocs. v. Mattel, Inc., 128 S. Ct. 1396, 1404 (2008). 
 129. 9 U.S.C. § 9 (2006). 
 130. Hall St. Assocs., 128 S. Ct. at 140-05. 
 131. 346 U.S. 427 (1953).  In Wilko, the Court stated, “Power [under the FAA] to 
vacate an award is limited. . . . In unrestricted submission, such as the present . . . 
agreements envisage, the interpretations of the law by the arbitrators in contrast to the 
manifest disregard are not subject . . . to judicial review for error in interpretation.”  Id. 
at 436-38 (internal citations omitted) (emphasis added). 
 132. The “manifest disregard” standard is a judicially created exception intended to 
prevent knowing and/or intentional violations of the law.  See, e.g., Westerbecke Corp. 
v. Daihatsu Motor Co., 304 F.3d 200, 217 (2d Cir. 2002) (holding that an arbitrator 
manifestly disregards the law when “the arbitrator kn[ows] of the relevant principle, 
appreciate[s] that this principle controlled the outcome of the disputed issue, and none-
theless willfully flout[s] the governing law by refusing to apply it”).  While public poli-
cy violations and manifest disregard violations could certainly overlap where an arbi-
trator knowingly and/or intentionally violated positive law, the two are not the same.  
For instance, a public policy violation can exist even when the arbitrator is unaware of 
positive law, whereas a manifest disregard violation cannot exist unless the arbitrator is 
aware of the positive law but nonetheless ignores it.  Id.  Furthermore, the two are 
nearly universally treated as separate doctrines.  See, e.g., B.L. Harbert Int’l., L.L.C. v. 
Hercules Steel Co., 441 F.3d 905, 910 (11th Cir. 2006); Prestige Ford v. Ford Dealer 
Computer Servs., Inc., 324 F.3d 391, 395 (5th Cir. 2003); Banco de Seguros del Estado 
v. Mut. Marine Office, Inc., 344 F.3d 255, 263-64 (2d Cir. 2003); LaPrade v. Kidder, 
Peabody & Co., 246 F.3d 702, 706 (D.C. Cir. 2001); Stephen L. Hayford, Unification of 
the Law of Labor Arbitration and Commercial Arbitration:  An Idea Whose Time Has 
Come, 52 BAYLOR L. REV. 781, 870-73 (2000); Kratovil, supra note 42, at 486-91.  But 
see Joseph Stevens & Co. v. Cikanek, 2008 WL 2705445, at *4 (N.D. Ill. 2008) (“[A]n 
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utory bases of review, then parties are also free to do so.  The Court dis-
agreed, reasoning the language within Wilko did not sanction an addi-
tional ground for vacatur.133  Specifically, the Court stated: 
Maybe the term “manifest disregard” was meant to name a new 
ground for review, but maybe it merely referred to the § 10 grounds 
collectively, rather than adding to them.  Or, as some courts have 
thought, “manifest disregard” may have been shorthand for § 
10(a)(3) or § 10(a)(4), the subsections authorizing vacatur when the 
arbitrators were “guilty of misconduct” or “exceeded their 
powers.”134 
Second, Hall Street argued parties should be able to expand judicial 
review because the FAA explicitly favors the freedom to contract.  The 
Court again disagreed, referring to its plain meaning analysis.135 
arbitration award may be vacated if the arbitrators ‘manifestly disregarded’ the law by 
directing the parties to violate the law . . . .”).  Before Hall Street Associates, at least 
seven circuits accepted the manifest disregard of the law standard as a basis for vacatur 
under the FAA.  See, e.g., McCarthy v. Citigroup Global Mkts., Inc., 463 F.3d 87, 91 
(1st Cir. 2006); Hoeft v. MVL Group, Inc., 343 F.3d 57, 64 (2d Cir. 2003); Prestige 
Ford v. Ford Dealer Computer Servs., Inc., 324 F.3d 391, 395-96 (5th Cir. 2003); 
Westerbecke Corp. v. Daihatsu Motor Co., 304 F.3d 200, 217 (2d Cir. 2002); Williams 
v. Cigna Fin. Advisors, Inc., 197 F.3d 752, 759 (5th Cir. 1999); Scott v. Prudential 
Secs., Inc., 141 F.3d 1007, 1017 (11th Cir. 1998); Barnes v. Logan, 122 F.3d 820, 821 
(9th Cir. 1997); Cole v. Burns Int’l Sec. Servs., 105 F.3d 1465, 1486 (D.C. Cir. 1997); 
M & C Corp. v. Erwin Behr GmbH & Co., KG, 87 F.3d 844, 850-51 (6th Cir. 1996); 
see Brabham v. A.G. Edwards & Sons, Inc., 376 F.3d 377, 387 (5th Cir. 2004) (per 
curiam); Am. Laser Vision, P.A. v. Laser Vision Inst., L.L.C., 487 F.3d 255, 259 (5th 
Cir. 2007) (“Vacatur based on an arbitrator’s manifest disregard of the law . . . 
[requires] more than error or misunderstanding with respect to the law.  The error must 
have been obvious and capable of being readily and instantly perceived by the average 
person qualified to serve as an arbitrator.”). 
 133. Hall St. Assocs., 128 S. Ct. at 1403. 
 134. Id. at 1404 (internal citations omitted). 
 135. Justice Scalia joined in the opinion of the Court with the exception of one foot-
note regarding legislative history.  Id. at 1400 n.1.  Both Justice Stevens and Justice 
Breyer dissented.  Id. at 1408-10.  Justice Stevens’s dissent argues that the majority’s 
decision conflicts with the primary purpose of the FAA, as the intent of Congress in 
creating the FAA was to place agreements to arbitrate on the same footing as other 
contracts.  Thus, Justice Stevens argues that Congressional intent is best served by per-
mitting parties to alter the vacatur provisions through contract.  Id. Justice Breyer’s dis-
sent also revolves around the principal purpose of the FAA, which he contends was to 
shield arbitration agreements from judicial pens rather than to prevent the creative pens 
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In sum, Hall Street Associates is perhaps best characterized as a 
silent bang, as few courts have analyzed the decision because it relates 
to non-statutory review mechanisms. Those courts that have examined 
the decision, however, have reached inconsistent conclusions regarding 
its effect on the public policy exception.  For instance, at least one court 
is cautiously optimistic that the public policy exception was untouched 
by the Court in Hall Street Associates, explaining that if one assumes the 
public policy exception is an outgrowth of the contractual powers 
ground,136 then the exception survived.137  Other courts have discussed 
the public policy exception, but have not mentioned whether Hall Street 
Associates would have any effect on the exception.138 
Notwithstanding the judicial discussions above, none of the courts 
that reviewed this issue have evaluated the exception’s continued vitality 
– or lack thereof – using anything other than conclusory analysis.  More 
importantly, no other court has used what the Supreme Court would 
presumably use: statutory construction principles.139 
of parties.  Consequently, Justice Breyer opines, parties’ alteration of the vacatur provi-
sions by contract does not offend the legislative intent of Congress.  Id. at 1410. 
 136. 9 U.S.C. § 10(a)(4) (2006). 
 137. Chase Bank USA, N.A. v. Hale, 859 N.Y.S.2d 342, 351 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2008) 
(stating that, assuming the public policy exception is an interpretation of 10(a)(4) and 
not a common law means for vacatur, the exception would survive the Hall Street 
opinion).  But see Prime Therapeutics, L.L.C. v. Omnicare, Inc., 555 F. Supp. 2d 993, 
998 (D. Minn. 2008) (“[T]he Supreme Court held that Sections 10 and 11 of the FAA 
provide the exclusive grounds for vacating and modifying an arbitration award.”); 
Ascension Orthopedics, Inc. v. Curasan, AG, 2008 WL 2074058, at *2 (S.D. Tex. May 
14, 2008) (“Hall Street is unequivocal that the grounds upon which vacatur may be 
based as listed in § 10 are exclusive.”); Chase Bank USA, 859 N.Y.S.2d at 348 (“The 
Supreme Court has now announced, however, that section 10 of the FAA provides the 
exclusive route for expedited judicial vacatur of an arbitral award under the federal 
statutory scheme.”); Robert Lewis Rosen Assocs., Ltd. v. Webb, 566 F. Supp. 2d 228, 
232 (S.D.N.Y. 2008) (“[T]he Supreme Court has recently held that the FAA’s narrow 
statutory grounds for vacatur are exclusive.”). 
 138. Saturn Telecomms. Servs., Inc. v. Covad Commc’ns. Co., 560 F. Supp. 2d 
1278, 1281 n.1 (S.D. Fla. 2008) (stating, without citing to Hall St. Assocs., that public 
policy is a non-statutory ground for vacatur); Houston Ref., L.P. v. United Steel, Paper 
& Forestry, Rubber, Mfg., Energy, Allied Indus. & Serv. Workers Int’l Union, 2008 
WL 2415525, at *4 (S.D. Tex. June 4, 2008) (stating, without reference to Hall St. 
Assocs., that the public policy exception is a non-statutory basis for granting vacatur 
under the FAA). 
 139. See Rodriquez De Quijas v. Shearson/Am. Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477, 481-83 
(1989) (harmonizing the FAA with provisions of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 
15 U.S.C. § 77 (2006 & Supp. 2008)); Shearson/Am. Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 482 
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V.  CONFLICTING PRINCIPLES:  THE FAA VERSUS  
THE PUBLIC POLICY EXCEPTION 
As stated earlier, the Court in Hall Street Associates explicitly 
stated that the four grounds found within section 10 are the exclusive 
bases for vacatur under the FAA.140While none of the courts discussing 
Hall Street Associates have specifically ruled on whether the public 
policy exception has survived the opinion, application of basic statutory 
construction principles indicates the public policy exception has not 
survived post-Hall. 
The provisions of the FAA aside, a statute cannot abrogate a consti-
tutional provision.141  Rather, only a constitutional amendment can abro-
gate or modify constitutional provisions.142  Consequently, if the FAA, 
as a result of an arbitrator’s award, invites a court to engage in an uncon-
stitutional act, the court must decline.143 
In the absence of a constitutional conflict, the situation becomes 
more complicated.  Pursuant to basic statutory construction principles, 
when two statutes are inconsistent, typically the courts will initially at-
tempt to harmonize them.144  For instance, imagine two parties, A and B, 
U.S. 220, 227-31, 238-42 (1987) (harmonizing the FAA with provisions of both the 
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78 (2006 & Supp. 2008) and the 
Racketeer Influences and Corrupt Organizations Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1961 (2006 & Supp. 
2008)); Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 625-
31 (1985) (harmonizing the FAA with provisions of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1 
(2006 & Supp. 2008)); see also Hall St. Assocs. v. Mattel, Inc., 128 S. Ct. 1396, 1403 
(2008) (using plain meaning analysis to construe the FAA’s meaning). 
 140. Hall St. Assocs., 128 S. Ct. at 1402-03. 
 141. See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 178 (1803). 
 142. See, e.g., U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl. 1, amended by U.S. CONST. amend. XVII, § 
1 (changing the method of election of senators).  Thus, if a statute and a constitutional 
provision conflict, the constitutional provision will prevail. Marbury, 5 U.S. at 178, 
180. 
 143. For instance, if the Hurd circumstances were repeated and the case was arbi-
trated, courts could avoid enforcement of the award – not on the basis of the public poli-
cy exception, but rather on the basis that the FAA could not force a court to engage in 
an unconstitutional act. 
 144. See, e.g., Smith v. Robinson, 468 U.S. 992, 1024 (1984) (“[C]onflicting statutes 
should be interpreted so as to give effect to each . . . .”); United States v. Borden Co., 
308 U.S. 188, 198 (1939) (“It is a cardinal principle of construction that . . . [w]hen 
there are two acts upon the same subject, the rule is to give effect to both if possible.”); 
Wilderness Soc’y v. Morton, 479 F.2d 842, 881 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (“Courts should make 
every effort to reconcile allegedly conflicting statutes and to give effect to the language 
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conspire to fix the price of widgets in the geographical area spanning 
Washington, Idaho, and Oregon.145  Imagine further that A and B 
execute a written agreement to that effect, which contains an arbitration 
agreement invoking the FAA.  Subsequently, A breaches the agreement 
and, pursuant to the arbitration provision, A and B arbitrate the dispute.  
Thereafter, the arbitrator issues an award in favor of B and A moves to 
vacate the award.  Should a court confirm the award? 
First, the agreement itself is illegal because it violates federal statu-
tory law.146  The only remaining analysis, therefore, is whether the FAA 
nonetheless requires confirmation.  Initially, illegality is not a ground 
contained within sections 10 and 11 as the courts have thus far inter-
preted those sections.147  Furthermore, the example does not indicate any 
statutory basis for vacatur under the FAA.  Thus, the court must decide 
two things:  do the FAA and the criminal prohibition conflict with each 
other and, if so, can the two be harmonized? 
Even assuming these statutes conflict, they can indeed be harmo-
nized.  When two statutes allegedly conflict, the court should always 
construe them so as to give each the fullest possible effect.148  In this 
light, the two statutes appear compatible: one merely requires arbitration 
in certain circumstances, while the other prohibits price fixing.  Conse-
quently, the statutes can co-exist.  The law criminally punishes those 
who either engage in price fixing or conspire to do so, but if a party does 
engage in such conduct under an agreement that includes an arbitration 
clause, the dispute will be handled by arbitration, at least for its civil 
component.149 
and intent of both, so long as doing so does not deprive one or the other of its essential 
meaning.”). 
 145. This example is loosely based on United States v. U.S. Gypsum Co., 340 U.S. 
76 (1950), and Hammes v. AAMCO Transmission, Inc., 33 F.3d 774, 783 (7th Cir. 
1994). 
 146. See 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2006) (“Every contract, combination in the form of trust or 
otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the several States, . . . 
is hereby declared to be illegal.”); U.S. Gypsum Co., 340 U.S. at 85 (holding that price 
fixing is prohibited by the Sherman Act). 
 147. See supra note 47. 
 148. See supra note 144. 
 149. Some could argue the courts would apply a different statutory construction 
principle requiring that statutes relating to a specific matter trump statutes relating to a 
general matter.  See, e.g., United States v. Estate of Romani, 523 U.S. 517, 530-32 
(1998).  This principle provides no relief, however, as the vacatur provisions of the 
FAA are the more specific principles in this instance.  For this argument to prevail in 
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Of course, that construction creates a conflict with the Court’s 
ruling in Hurd:150  a court will not enforce a contract that is against pub-
lic policy or, in this circumstance, illegal.151  While reason would dictate 
that Hurd’s directives must survive after Hall Street Associates, that 
view misses a crucial point. Hurd’s premise – at least insofar as the 
Court stated it in that case and has since permitted it to evolve in the 
context of arbitration jurisprudence – derives from a common law rule.  
As between a statute and a common law rule, the statute prevails.152  
Consequently, Hall Street Associates’ exclusivity language demonstrates 
that the public policy exception has withered on the vine.153 
VI.  THE COURT’S ELIMINATION OF THE PUBLIC POLICY EXCEPTION 
CREATES UNDESIRABLE RESULTS 
The Court’s elimination of the public policy exception creates un-
desirable results, as it undermines both:  (a) the judiciary’s social con-
tract duties, thereby endangering the public, and (b) the public’s faith in 
the judiciary. 
A. Undermining of the Judiciary’s Social Contract Duties 
The heart of the social contract is that the government exists for and 
at the will of the majority.  Designed as a protector, the government is 
essentially a large, resourceful guardian, capable of protecting its indi-
vidual parts and laws.154  If this were not so, government would cease to 
 
the example above, the price-fixing prohibition would need a provision specifically 
prohibiting the enforcement of such an agreement in an arbitration setting. 
 150. Hurd v. Hodge, 334 U.S. 24 (1948) 
 151. See id. at 34-35. 
 152. See United States v. Texas, 507 U.S. 529, 534 (1993) (“Congress need not 
affirmatively proscribe the common-law . . . . [C]ourts may take it as a given that 
Congress has legislated with an expectation that the [common law] principle will apply 
except when a statutory purpose to the contrary is evident.”) (internal quotations 
omitted); City of Milwaukee v. Illinois, 451 U.S. 304, 312-14 (1981) (stating that when 
Congress enacts a statute on a subject matter previously governed by the common law, 
the statute controls). 
 153. While this discussion only specifically referenced the first form, analysis of the 
second form would follow the same path.  Furthermore, analysis of the third form 
would not even survive initial scrutiny, as statutory construction principles are 
unnecessary when statutes conflict with the common law. 
 154. See Locke, supra note 56, at 780 (“The great end of men’s entering into society 
being the enjoyment of their properties in peace and safety . . . .”). 
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serve a function.155  Thus, the elimination of the public policy exception, 
in any of its various forms, is troubling as it would require the judiciary, 
at least in some circumstances, to violate its duties under the social 
contract. 
1. Illegality and Award Forms 
Removing the illegality156 and award forms157 undermines the judi-
ciary’s social contract duty to enforce the laws of the majority as writ-
ten; without these forms, the judiciary must permit maverick arbitration 
awards despite their illegality. 
As stated earlier, the public policy exception is an outgrowth of 
Lockean social contract doctrines.  Locke’s central theme was that the 
government should serve as an unbiased umpire to carry out the will of 
the majority and to resolve disputes in a fair manner.158  Inherent in and 
integral to that duty are the notions that every person is bound by the 
will of the majority,159 that no one can “discharge any member of the so-
ciety from his obedience” to the majority,160 and that the government is 
bound to dispense justice consistent with the positive law.161 
In this context, the judiciary’s enforcement of illegal arbitration 
awards violates the founding principles, because a contract or award that 
violates positive law (a criminal prohibition) is by definition against the 
will of the majority.  Thus, the judiciary is duty-bound to avoid the 
ratification and enforcement of such an award. 
Arguably, the will of the majority is served by strictly following the 
mandates of the FAA’s vacatur provisions.162  Congress, the body acting 
on behalf of the majority, explicitly stated its will by narrowly defining 
the circumstances under which it believed vacatur would be reasonable.  
 155. See id. 
 156. The illegality form exists where the contract itself violates positive law.  See 
discussion supra Part III.D. 
 157. The award form exists where the contract is legal, but the arbitrator’s award 
nonetheless violates positive law.  See discussion supra Part III.D. 
 158. Locke, supra note 56, at 764-65 (“And thus all private judgment of every 
particular member being excluded, the community comes to be umpire, by settled 
standing rules, indifferent, and the same to all parties; and by men having authority 
from the community, for the execution of those rules . . . .”). 
 159. Id. at 781. 
 160. Id. at 780 (emphasis omitted). 
 161. Id. at 781. 
 162. See FAA vacatur provisions and accompanying text cited supra note 41. 
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Consequently, vacating an award on any ground not found within the 
FAA would contravene the majority’s will and violate a social contract. 
This position, however, overlooks the fact that Congress also pro-
hibited the criminal conduct – also a statement of the majority’s will – 
and a court’s enforcement of such a provision assists the parties to en-
gage in behavior that the public has decided is, at best, undesirable.  The 
question, therefore, becomes one of choice.  Which violation is more 
sinister to the principles of the social contract – violating the provisions 
of the FAA by vacating an award on a ground not permitted therein or 
assisting the parties in conduct the majority has prohibited as criminal?  
Given that the chief goal of government is to protect persons and 
property, coupled with the fact that criminally prohibited actions are 
more dangerous than violations of the FAA,163 this seems to be an easy 
choice. 
2. Pure Policy Form 
Removing the pure policy form164 forces the judiciary to violate its 
inherent social-contract duty to protect the public.165  As stated earlier, 
the ultimate duty of government is to protect its individual members.166  
The waning of the pure policy form substantially undermines this prin-
ciple, as its absence requires the judiciary to ratify arbitration awards 
that are potentially dangerous to the public. 
Critics of the pure policy form have three main objections.  First, 
critics argue that no award could simultaneously violate public policy 
and fall short of violating positive law.167  Second, even assuming such 
an award could exist, critics believe that preserving the court’s ability to 
fashion a remedy for such an event would lead to confusion and un-
 163. See Locke, supra note 56, at 778, 780, 782. 
 164. The pure policy form exists where neither the contract nor the arbitration award 
violates positive law, but where the award violates public policy.  See discussion supra 
Part III.D. 
 165. As stated earlier, examples of the pure policy form almost always arise in cir-
cumstances where the contract or award endangers the safety of the public.  See discus-
sion supra Part III.D. 
 166. See Locke, supra note 56, at 778, 780, 782. 
 167. See E. Associated Coal Corp. v. United Mine Workers of Am., Dist. 17, 531 
U.S. 57, 68-69 (2000) (Scalia, J., concurring).  But see Stead Motors v. Auto. 
Machinists Lodge No. 1173, 886 F.2d 1200, 1218-19 (9th Cir. 1989) (en banc) (Trott, 
J., dissenting); Randall, supra note 3, at 782-83. 
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certainty.168  Finally, critics hold that the public policy form permits 
courts a “fast and loose” method of vacating awards with which a court 
simply disagrees.169 
None of these objections, however, withstands scrutiny. Tech-
nology and society are always changing and with those changes come 
concomitant modifications in the positive law.  But the evolution of the 
positive law is inherently much slower than the change that drives it. 
Thus, a significant time lag exists between the entrance of innovations 
into the mainstream and the development of the respective positive law. 
While plenty of examples are certainly available, this premise is so 
basic that it does not warrant extended discussion.  Indeed, the concept 
that positive law, including the Constitution itself, is living and 
breathing has become a common feature of jurisprudence.170  Moreover, 
to the extent maverick arbitrators would be the exception and not the 
rule, that premise is unsettling; presumably, the entire appellate court 
structure exists, at least in part, to control unruly or simply incorrect 
decisions by the inferior courts.  More importantly, assuming maverick 
arbitrators are indeed rare, even one lone arbitrator could still seriously 
endanger the safety and welfare of the public.171 
As to the second criticism, the question is whether the confusion 
and uncertainty is a price worth paying.  The answer is inevitably yes, 
particularly when the alternative is to leave the courts unable to protect 
the public against danger; such a position is irresponsible and violates 
the court’s social-contract duty, as stewards of the government, to pro-
tect the public.172  Finally, while many critics believe that the exception 
opens the door to judicial review of awards on the merits, the numbers 
 168. See Scott Barbakoff, Application of the Public Policy Exception for the 
Enforcement of Arbitral Awards:  There is No Place like “the Home” in Saint Mary 
Home, Inc. v. Service Employees International Union, District 1199, 43 VILL. L. REV. 
829, 865-66 (1998); Laurie A. Tribble, Vacating Arbitrators’ Awards Under the Public 
Policy Exception:  Are Courts Second-Guessing Arbitrators’ Decisions?, 38 VILL. L. 
REV. 1051, 1081-82 (1993); E. Associated Coal Corp., 531 U.S. at 68-69 (Scalia, J., 
concurring). 
 169. Stephen L. Hayford, Law in Disarray: Judicial Standards for Vacatur of 
Commercial Arbitration Awards, 30 GA. L. REV. 731, 800-01 (1996). 
 170. See Eric R. Claeys, The Limits of Empirical Political Science and the 
Possibilities of Living-Constitution Theory for a Retrospective on the Rehnquist Court, 
47 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 737, 742 (2003). 
 171. See supra text accompanying notes 105-13. 
 172. See Locke, supra note 56, at 780. 
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simply do not pan out.  Rather, as Professors Hodges and Goldman have 
noted, the exception is rarely used and is rarely successful.173 
B. Undermining Public Confidence 
Removal of the public policy exception will also undermine the 
public’s confidence in the judiciary.  The judiciary is considered the ulti-
mate arbiter of justice – blind to emotion, above reproach, and complete-
ly unbiased.174  Forcing the courts to ignore their social-contract duties is 
bound to tarnish their image. 
For example, imagine that the public learns that a court was aware 
of an arbitration award endangering the public but nonetheless refused to 
exercise its social contract power to deny it.  The reputations of that 
court and of the broader legal system are likely to suffer. 
The same can be said of the court’s enforcement of an illegal con-
tract.  Referring again to the price-fixing example,175 imagine the public 
learns of the court’s enforcement of that contract.  Aiding and abetting 
criminal behavior is illegal, but it is unlikely that the courts would be 
charged with violating the law for confirming the award, notwith-
standing the social-contract inconsistency.176 Thus, the perception 
becomes, “the law applies to everyone except the courts.” 
While courts frequently make unpopular decisions that evoke the 
public ire, the potential for severe criticism here is even more damaging.  
 
 173. Hodges, supra note 15, at 95 (“A study of cases challenging arbitration awards 
between 1960 and 1988 found 73 cases in which the public policy argument was the 
primary claim.”) (citing Peter Feuille & Michael LeRoy, Grievance Arbitration Appeals 
in the Federal Courts:  Facts and Figures, 45 ARB. J. 35, 44 (1990)); Goldman, supra 
note 15, at 181 (stating challenges to awards on this ground are rarely successful); see 
also Burton, supra note 5, at 482 (“In practice, courts vacate few arbitral awards.”). 
 174. See Martha J. Dragich, Justice Blackmun, Franz Kafka, and Capital 
Punishment, 63 MO. L. REV. 853, 905 (1998) (“We expect that many decisions are 
difficult – even agonizing – but in order to maintain our confidence in the courts, we 
expect judges to carry out dispassionately the duties we have entrusted to them. . . . We 
do not expect to read in opinions the judge’s personal views – in fact, we expect judges, 
as unbiased arbiters, to set personal beliefs aside.”); see also Ellis Sandoz, Religion and 
the American Founding, 20 REGENT U. L. REV. 17, 25 n.55 (2007-2008) (“The law is 
reason unaffected by desire.” (quoting Aristotle, POLITICS 1287a:28-32 (Benjamin 
Jowett trans.), reprinted in 2 THE WORKS OF ARISTOTLE 445, 485 (W.D. Ross, ed., 
Encyclopedia Britanica, Inc. 1952))). 
 175. See discussion supra Part V. 
 176. See Locke, supra note 56, at 781 (stating that the government is bound to 
dispense justice consistent with the laws of the majority). 
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Unpopular decisions on the basis of substantive merit quite often have 
survived within the system, with the judiciary ultimately maintaining 
some modicum of respect based on the presumption that, while the parti-
cular result is not perhaps agreeable to the public, the court was attempt-
ing to protect the fabric of the law.  In this case, however, the court 
would not be protecting the public or the fabric of the law.  Rather, the 
court would be deciding to simply protect private parties to a contract, 
perhaps even at the majority’s expense. 
VII.  PROPOSALS 
There are three potential remedies that may resolve this problem.  
Congress could amend the FAA to include the public policy exception.  
Alternatively, courts could construe the public policy exception as being 
part and parcel to the contractual powers prong177 of the vacatur pro-
visions.  Lastly, courts could construe the public policy exception as an 
inherent power of the judiciary, existing beyond the reach of Congres-
sional limitation.  This Part will discuss each of these potential remedies 
in turn below. 
A. Congress could amend the FAA to include  
the Public Policy Exception 
While it is certainly true that most state statutes do not include a 
public policy exception,178 the notion of a statutory exception is not a 
 
 177. 9 U.S.C. § 10(a)(4) (2006). 
 178. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 6-6-14 (2005); ALASKA STAT. § 09.43.500 (2006); 
ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 12-1512 (2003); ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-108-212 (2006); CAL. CIVIL 
PROCEDURE CODE § 1286.4 (2007); COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-22-223 (2006); DEL. CODE 
ANN. tit. 10, § 5714 (1999); D.C. CODE ANN. § 16-4311 (2005); FLA. STAT. ch. 682.13 
(2003); GA. CODE ANN. § 9-9-13 (2007); HAW. REV. STAT. § 658A-23 (2007); IDAHO 
CODE § 7-912 (2004); 710 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/12 (2008); IND. CODE § 34-57-2-13 
(1998); IOWA CODE § 679A.12 (1998); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 5-412 (2001); KY. REV. 
STAT. ANN. § 417.160 (2005); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:4210 (1997); ME. REV. STAT. 
ANN. tit. 14, § 5938 (1993); MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 3-224 (Supp. 2008); 
MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 251, § 12 (2004); MICH. COMP. LAWS § 600.5081 (Supp. 2008); 
MINN. STAT. § 572.19 (Supp. 2008); MISS. CODE ANN. § 11-15-23 (2004); MO. REV. 
STAT. § 435.405 (Supp. 2008); MONT. CODE ANN. § 27-5-312 (2007); NEB. REV. STAT. 
§ 25-1613 (1996); NEV. REV. STAT. 38.241 (2006); N.H. REV. STAT. § 542:8 (2006); 
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:24-8 (2000); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 44-7A-24 (2004); N.Y. C.P.L.R. 
7511 (1998 & Supp. 2007); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-54 (2007); N.D. LAWS 32-29.3-23 
(Supp. 2007); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2711.10 (2000); OKLA. STAT. tit. 12, § 1874 
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jurisprudence, potentially undermining the perception of integrity. 
 
novel one.  For example, the exception exists within the New York 
Convention,179 the French New Code of Civil Procedure,180 and was 
considered during the drafting of the Uniform Arbitration Ac
A”).181 
Furthermore, the mere absence of such statutory mechanisms in the 
state systems does not alone support a strong argument that such a pro-
vision should not exist; after all, state statutes are premised upon the 
UAA – a uniform act that declines to adopt the exception.  Alternatively, 
an equally likely reason that such provisions are absent is that most st
ts believe the exception applies as a common law mechanism.182 
In addition to maintaining the status quo in terms of the FAA’s 
goals,183 this proposal carries the added benefit of not requiring the ju-
diciary to “turn tail” on its former interpretations of contractual po
(2007); OR. REV. STAT. § 36.705 (2007); 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 7314 (2007); R.I. GEN. 
LAWS § 10-3-12 (1997); S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-48-130 (2005); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 
21-25A-24 (2004); TENN. CODE ANN. § 29-5-313 (2000); TEX CODE ANN. § 171.088 
(2005); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-31a-124 (2002); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 5677 (2002); 
VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-581.010 (2007); WASH. REV. CODE § 7.04A. 230 (2007); W. 
VA. CODE § 55-10-4 (2000); WIS. STAT. § 788.10 (2001); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 1-36-114 
(2007).  But see CONN. GEN. STAT. § 50a-136 (2006). 
 179. The Convention on Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, 
21 U.S.T. 2517, 330 U.N.T.S. 38 (June 10, 1958) (providing enforcement mechanisms 
where parties from different countries agree to arbitrate).  See Moses, supra note 15, at 
457 (citing The Convention on Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral 
Awards, 21 U.S.T. 2517, 330 U.N.T.S. 38 (June 10, 1958)). 
 180. N.C.P.C. art. 1502 (Fr.); see Moses supra note 15, at 461 (citing Article 1502 
of the French New Code of Civil Procedure) (permitting an appeal on the basis that “the 
recognition of enforcement shall be contrary to public international order). 
 181. NAT’L CONFERENCE OF COMM’RS ON UNIF. STATE LAWS, supra note 48. 
(stating the Commission did not ultimately adopt a public policy exception provision 
because the Commission:  (1) feared it would preempted by a negative ruling from the 
Supreme Court; and (2) feared drafting a bright-line rule would be too difficult).  For a 
history of the Uniform Arbitration Act, see John M. McCabe, Uniformity in ADR:  
Thoughts on the Uniform Arbitration Act and Uniform Mediation Act, 3 PEPPERDINE 
DIS. RESOL. L.J. 317 (2003). 
 182. 4 AM. JUR. 2D Alternative Dispute Resolution § 214 (2008). 
 183. In fact, notwithstanding the existence of such a provision within the New York 
Convention, enforcement of awards under that provision “is considered one of the 
major advantages of international commercial arbitration.”  Moses, supra note 15, at 
457 n.149 (citing JACK J. COE, JR., INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION: 
AMERICAN PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICE IN A GLOBAL CONTEXT 303-06 (1997)). 
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more rarely successful.189 
The disadvantage of this proposal, of course, is that even assuming 
Congress was inclined to adopt such a provision,184 Congressional 
action is “slow and irresolute,”185 leaving a substantial amount of time 
for significant damage to the fabric of the law.  Indeed, damage is 
already beginning to occur in the lower courts.186  An additional 
criticism worth noting exists within the comments of the UAA itself.  As 
stated earlier, the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform 
State Laws ultimately rejected a public policy exception within the 
UAA, reasoning that, among other things, drafting a bright-line rule 
would be difficult.187  Nevertheless, Congress could state the exception 
summarily.  For instance, the exception could be simply added to section 
10, and could read: “(5) where the underlying contract or the award 
violated public policy.”  This would leave the courts free to interpret 
what precisely constitutes a violation of public policy, a feat the 
Supreme Court has already accomplished with some certainty in 
Grace.188  Furthermore, to the extent critics would argue that an express 
exception would open the floodgates to merit-based-searching review of 
arbitration awards, such concerns have remained in utero for the past 
half century, as public policy violations are rarely litigated and even
 
 184. Congress, through inaction, has demonstrated a reluctance to amend the FAA.  
See Cameron L. Sabin, The Adjudicatory Boat Without a Keel: Private Arbitration and 
the Need for Public Oversight of Arbitrators, 87 IOWA L. REV. 1337, 1367 (2002) 
(“Despite expressions of concern about the problems of arbitration, Congress has yet to 
reassess the FAA.”).  Thus, perhaps the greatest criticism of this proposal is that 
A, POLITICO (Jan. 26, 2008), http://www.politico.com/news/stories/ 
M’RS ON UNIF. STATE LAWS, supra note 48. 
amendment is politically infeasible. 
 185. Matt Collins, Congress Fails Science, SCIENTIFIC AMERICAN MAGAZINE (Dec. 
2007); see Lee Hamilton, What I Wish Political Scientists Would Teach About 
Congress, CONGRESSLINK (Dec. 2000), http://www.congresslink.org/print_expert_poli 
sciteach.htm (stating Congress is “painfully slow”); see also Mike Allen, Bush Presses 
Congress on FIS
0108/8117.html. 
 186. See cases cited supra note 132. 
 187. See NAT’L CONFERENCE OF COM
 188. See discussion supra Part III.B. 
 189. Critics argue that such a move would open the floodgates to litigation, as 
parties would actively seek vacatur on the basis of the exception.  This criticism, while 
widespread, is confusing.   The exception has already existed, albeit in a common law 
form, for quite a while, and no one is rolling up his pants.  Rather, as some scholars 
have noted, the exception is rarely used.  See Hodges, supra note 15, at 95 (“A study of 
cases challenging arbitration awards between 1960 and 1988 found 73 cases in which 
the public policy argument was the primary claim.”) (citing Feuille & LeRoy, supra 
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B. Courts Could Construe the Public Policy Exception as Being 
 Part and Parcel to Section 10(a)(4) 
As stated earlier, courts and scholars have almost universally con-
strued the public policy exception as being separate from those included 
within the FAA.190  Nevertheless, depending on the interpretation of the 
Supreme Court’s opinion in Hall Street Associates, the Court may have 
left a slight crack in their otherwise statutorily closed door.  When dis-
cussing the manifest disregard of the law exception, the Court did not 
explicitly foreclose the possibility that sections 10(a)(3) and 10(a)(4) 
could include extreme errors of law.191  Instead, the Court stated: 
 
note 17, at 44).  Challenges to awards on this ground are rarely successful.  See 
tory grounds and the public policy 
Goldman, supra note 15, at 181; 1 DOMKE ON COM. ARB. § 38:10 (2008). 
 190. See cases cited supra note 47.  Scholars like Professor Hayford, however, have 
discussed the possible link between the statu
exception.  Hayford, supra note 169, at 756-63. 
 191. Some courts have held that the “manifest disregard of law standard” survived 
based on this analysis.  See, e.g., UMass Mem’l Med. Ctr., Inc. v. United Food & 
Commercial Workers Union, Local 1445, 527 F.3d 1, 6 (1st Cir. 2008) (holding, 
without citing to Hall St. Assocs., that courts maintain the inherent power to vacate 
awards for manifest disregard of the law); Joseph Stevens & Co., Inc. v. Cikanek, 2008 
WL 2705445, at *4 (N.D. Ill. July 9, 2008) (“[A]n arbitration award may be vacated if 
the arbitrators ‘manifestly disregarded’ the law by directing the parties to violate the 
law of by failing to adhere to the legal principles specified by the contract.”); Reeves v. 
Chase Bank, N.A., 2008 WL 2783231 (E.D. Mo. July 15, 2008) (holding the courts 
may vacate using the manifest disregard of the law standard); Mastec N. Am., Inc. v. 
MSE Power Sys., Inc., 2008 WL 2704912 (N.D.N.Y. 2008) (holding the manifest 
disregard for the law standard is an outgrowth of section 10 of the FAA); Prime 
Therapeutics, L.L.C. v. Omnicare, 2008 WL 2152207 (D. Minn. 2008); Houston 
Refining, L.P. v. United Steel, Paper & Forestry, Rubber, Mfg., Energy, Allied Indus. & 
Serv. Worker’s Int’l Union, 2008 WL 2415525 (S.D. Tex. 2008) (stating, without 
reference to Hall Street Associates, that manifest disregard of the law is a non-statutory 
basis for granting vacatur under the FAA); Chase Bank USA, N.A. v. Hale, 2008 WL 
1746984 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2008) (“[T]he Hall Street Court appears to have done nothing 
to jettison the “manifest disregard of law” standard of Wilko.”).   But see Rogers v. 
KBR Technical Servs. Inc., 2008 WL 2337184 (5th Cir. June 9, 2008) (calling into 
question whether manifest disregard for the law is still a viable method of vacatur post-
Hall); Wood v. Pennetex Res., L.P., 2008 WL 2609319 (S.D. Tex. June 27, 2008) 
(stating Hall St. Assocs. overruled fifth circuit precedent establishing manifest disregard 
of the law as a non-statutory means of vacatur); Robert Lewis Rosen Assocs., Ltd. v. 
Webb, 566 F. Supp. 2d 228 (S.D.N.Y. 2008) (holding that Hall St. Assocs. overruled the 
second circuit’s manifest disregard of the law jurisprudence); BNY Inv. Ctr., Inc. v. 
Bacchus, 2008 WL 2490062 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2008) (citing Hall Street Associates and 
stating “the viability of the manifest disregard for the law basis for vacatur is now in 
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Maybe the term “manifest disregard” was meant to name a new 
ground for review, but maybe it merely referred to the § 10 grounds 
collectively, rather than adding to them.  Or, as some courts have 
thought, “manifest disregard” may have been shorthand for § 
10(a)(3) or § 10(a)(4), the subsections authorizing vacatur when the 
arbitrators were “guilty of misconduct” or “exceeded their 
powers.”192 
While no one seems to be completely clear as to what this means, it 
is reasonable to believe that the Court was leaving some basis for a more 
searching review of arbitration awards.  Furthermore, while section 
10(a)(4) has not been interpreted as including the public policy excep-
tion in the past, nothing would preclude the courts from simply expand-
ing their interpretation of section 10(a)(4) to include the public policy 
exception.193 
If viewed broadly, the contractual powers ground194 could be con-
strued to encompass the public policy exception without substantially 
debasing the plain language of the statute.  Courts could interpret the 
section as encompassing two prongs:  (1) the traditional contractual 
powers prong, and (2) the public policy prong.  Thus, an arbitrator’s 
powers would stem not only from the contract, but also from the law 
itself.  Consequently, under the “powers prong,” an arbitrator would lack 
authority to enforce a contract or issue an award that the parties could 
not otherwise present in courts in a breach of contract action – one that 
violates the social contract. 
This approach would not undermine the goals of the FAA. As 
stated earlier, the twin goals of the FAA are to eliminate judicial hostili-
ty to arbitration and provide a speedy dispute resolution system.195  The 
proposal would neither enhance nor diminish those goals. At most, it 
would continue the status quo prior to Hall Street Associates, albeit 
using a slightly different path to reach the same result.196 
doubt”); Robert O. Sheridan, All Almost Quiet on the Expanded Review Front:  
Supreme Court Rejects Expansion of Judicial Review of Arbitration Awards, 13 
SUFFOLK J. TRIAL & APP. ADVOC. 93, 93 (2008) (stating, without analysis, that Hall St. 
.
all St. Assocs. v. Mattel, Inc., 128 S. Ct. 1396, 1404 (2008) (internal citations 
37 & 138. 
 to merit-based-searching review of arbitration awards, see cases cited supra 
Assocs  eliminated the manifest disregard for the law standard of review). 
 192. H
omitted). 
 193. See cases cited supra notes 1
 194. 9 U.S.C. § 10(a)(4) (2006). 
 195. Hall St. Assocs., 128 S. Ct. at 1404. 
 196. To the extent critics could argue that this proposal could open the proverbial 
floodgates
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The problem with this proposal, however, is that it requires the 
courts to derive a basis for public policy vacatur that is substantially dif-
ferent from the basis that they have nearly universally used thus far.  The 
courts have been absolutely clear that they perceive the public policy 
exception as derived from common law.  To turn tail now and claim a 
statutory basis would create the perception that courts generate rules 
from mere caprice.197 
C. Courts Could Permit the Public Policy Exception as an Inherent 
Power of the Courts That Exists Beyond Congressional Abrogation 
Notwithstanding the Supreme Court’s reluctance to look outside a 
strict reading of the FAA for vacatur grounds, courts could vacate arbi-
tration awards on public policy grounds under Lockean theories of in-
herent, general powers. 
As discussed earlier, courts have long taken the position that some 
powers are simply inherent to the judiciary.  For instance, courts have 
universally concluded that the power to hold parties in contempt is 
inherent.198  The courts could view the FAA in the same light, simply 
refusing to confirm judgments that would violate the social contract.  
Thus, even though Congress has not expressly permitted the courts to 
vacate, the courts would do so on the basis that, absent express authority 
from the majority (i.e., constitutional amendment), one branch of gov-
ernment cannot force another to commit or assist in committing an act 
otherwise violative of the social contract.199 
 
note 138. 
 197. As stated earlier, some courts have in fact done this with the manifest disregard 
 and 
 
of the law standard even in the short time since Hall.  See cases cited supra note 137. 
 198. See, e.g., Young v. United States ex rel. Vuitton et Fils S.A., 481 U.S. 787, 793 
(1987) (“[I]t is long settled that courts possess inherent authority to initiate contempt 
proceedings for disobedience to their orders . . . .”); In re Michael G., 747 P.2d 1152, 
1166 (Cal. 1988) (stating that a court has the inherent power to punish contempt); State 
v. Howell, 69 A. 1057, 1058 (Conn. 1908) (“The proceeding in contempt is for an 
offense against the court as an organ of public justice . . . . The power to punish such 
offenses is inherent in courts of record, to enable them to preserve their own dignity
to duly administer justice in the causes pending before them.”). 
 199. At first blush, this proposal may appear inconsistent with the holding in Grace.  
However, Grace did not consider whether a court could be compelled to enforce an 
illegal arbitration agreement on the basis of a statutory provision.  Rather, the Supreme 
Court examined in Grace whether courts were required to enforce a collective bargain-
ing agreement under the federal common law, where one party manufactured a conflict 
between its obligation to abide by a court order and its obligations under the collective 
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While the Court did not explicitly leave this option open in Hall 
Street Associates, some of the Court’s reasoning arguably could lead to 
this end.  As stated earlier, Hall Street argued that the Court’s use of the 
“manifest disregard of the law” standard in Wilko indicated that extra-
statutory mechanisms of vacatur existed and, based on this precedent, 
that parties were also free to contract for heightened review.  The Court 
disagreed, stating that Hall Street’s reading of this phrase was “too much 
for Wilko to bear,” as Hall Street was attempting to “leap from a 
supposed judicial expansion by interpretation to a private expansion by 
contract . . . .”200  This indicates that the Court views judicial expansion 
differently from private expansion, although the Court’s emphatic use of 
the word “exclusive” in reference to the vacatur provisions may belie 
such a notion. 
This final proposal is the best of the three, as it bears the same 
benefits of the first two but preserves the Court’s ability to exercise its 
social contract power to protect the public, even in the absence of Con-
gressional permission.  Indeed, this is certainly the position the courts 
have taken with regard to the contempt power, 201 reasoning the power 
bargaining agreement.  See W.R. Grace & Co. v. Local Union 759, 461 U.S. 757, 766 
(1983).  Furthermore, while violation of a court order is certainly serious, it pales in 
rcompa ison to public safety issues. 
 200. Hall St. Assocs. v. Mattel, Inc., 128 S. Ct. 1396, 1404 (2008). 
 201. See, e.g., Michaelson v. United States ex. rel. Chicago St. P., M & O Ry. Co., 
266 U.S. 42, 45 (1924) (“[T]he power to punish for contempts is inherent in all courts. . 
. . The courts of the United States, when called into existence and vested with 
jurisdiction over any subject, at once become possessed of the power.  So far as the 
inferior courts are concerned, however, it is not beyond the authority of Congress . . . ; 
but the attributes which inhere in that power and are inseparable from it can neither be 
abrogated not rendered practically inoperative.”); Walker v. Bentley, 678 So. 2d 1265, 
1267 (1996) (“[T]he power of a court to punish for contempt is an inherent one that 
exists independent of any statutory grant of authority and is essential to the execution, 
maintenance, and integrity of the judiciary. . . . [Thus,] the legislature may not . . . 
eliminate the ability of circuit courts to apply the inherent power . . .”); In re Doe, 26 
P.3d 562, 569 (Haw. 2001) (stating that legislative enactments permitting contempt are 
merely a restatement of the court’s inherent power, as the legislature is without power 
to unduly restrict or abrogate the power); In re Opinions of the Justices, 49 N.E.2d 252, 
257 (Mass. 1943 (stating absent a constitutional provision, the legislature lacked the 
power to limit or regulate the inherent power of the courts); City of Cincinnati v. 
Cincinnati Dist. Council 51, Am. Federation of State, County, and Municipal 
Employees, AFL-CIO, 299 N.E.2d 686, 691 (Ohio 1973) (“The power to punish for 
contempt is said to be inherent in the courts and to exist independently from express 
constitutional provision or legislative enactment.”); State ex. rel. Or. State Bar v. 
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government.204 
VII.  CONCLUSION 
does not derive from legislative enactment, and thus, the legislature is 
without authority to abrogate it, as one branch cannot remove that which 
it has not given.202 
While critics may argue this proposal suffers from the same con-
cerns as the second proposal – the courts will be viewed as inconsistent 
and governed only by whim – this proposal and the Court’s previous 
rulings can be made consistent.  First, as already stated, the Supreme 
Court may have already permitted a judicial window by differentiating 
contractually-derived vacatur grounds from judicially-derived vacatur 
grounds.  Furthermore, even assuming no such window was created, the 
Court’s previous position, while admittedly based in the common law, 
said nothing further of the root of the public policy exception, other than 
that the root was simply an inherent one.  Thus, courts could hold that 
the core of the public policy exception is the inherent, social-contract 
power of the courts (a power not given by Congress and thus not one 
subject to its discretion).203  This would achieve the ultimate goals of the 
public policy exception, preserve the vacatur goals of the FAA, and 
ensure the place of the judiciary as an equal branch of the 
The Court’s holding in Hall Street Associates is nothing short of a 
legal shockwave for both the fabric of the law and its social contract 
roots.  The prospect of court-enforced public policy violations com-
 
Lenske, 407 P.2d 250, 254 (Or. 1965) (“[T]he legislature cannot unreasonably abridge 
or destroy the judicial power to punish for contempt because the legislature cannot take 
away a power which it does not give.”); In the Interest of D.L.D., 327 N.W.2d 682, 687 
(Wis. 1982) (stating a court’s contempt power exists independent of statutory  
permission); see also Gray v. Comm’r of Revenue, 665 N.E.2d 17, 22 (Mass. 1996) 
(“The executive and legislative departments impermissibly interfere with judicial 
functions when they purport to restrict or abolish the court’s inherent powers.”). 
 202. See cases cited supra note 201. 
 203. Id. 
 204. This claim leads to a further criticism.  By disavowing the desires of Congress, 
the courts are ignoring their social-contract duties – to carry out the will of the majority.  
That criticism recalls the initial question:  what is the will of the majority? Assuming 
Locke is correct, the will of the majority, as represented by the government, will (or at 
least should) always be the protection and safety of its constituents.  Thus, when in 
doubt, and absent an explicit expression from the majority through constitutional law, 
the courts should exercise their social-contract power to fulfill those duties. 
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f, as one single maverick arbitrator is sufficient to 
serio




from Congress.  Otherwise, 
these problems will persist – to the detriment of the people, the judi-




promises the delicate social contract that the government shares with the 
people by undermining the very thing government was created to do:  
protect the public.  Furthermore, the criticism that violations of this 
nature would be so rare as to make this solely an academic discussion 
provides little relie
usly damage the fabric of the law both in concrete terms and in the 
eyes of the public. 
In addition to the above, the danger exists that courts, when faced 
with this problem, will invalidate awards based on the exception without 
attempting to conduct a rational legal analysis, ironically leading to the 
same uncertainty and 
ed, this is a scenario that has occurred already in the short time since 
the Court’s decision.205 
All is not yet lost.  The Court’s rather opaque distinction between 
party-driven and court-driven alterations to the vacatur provisions per-
haps signals that at least the public policy exception could surv
rwise exclusive provisions of the Act.  Additionally, of course, 
Congress is always free to amend the Act and add the exception. 
It seems clear, however, that the Court should create some manner, 
ideally in line with this article’s final proposal, of preserving its 
authority to invalidate contracts and awards based on the public policy 
exception, even absent explicit permission 
, and 
 205. See cases cited supra notes 137 & 138. 
